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The period covered by this chapter is marked by the expansion of power
exercised by Europeans or their descendants in South Africa. In the Cape
Colony, power shifted from a series of military governors to local offi-
cials elected under a nonracial, qualified franchise. A more original form
of government emerged in Natal, where representatives of the metropoli-
tan government ruled the African population while colonists of European
descent exercised only limited political powers. In the interior, Boer set-
tlers built two fragile republics on the basis of a racial franchise limited
to white men. The growth and expansion of these very different settler
states was conditional upon the conquest of the original inhabitants and
the alienation of their land. Wool-farming and plantation agriculture, and
later the mining of diamonds in the interior, brought a new urgency to the
development of the British colonies and to demands for land and labor. The
swell of change was carried far beyond the confines of British rule as people
adopted new identities more suitable to their changed situation. Race grew
into a primary factor of social classification, belonging, and exclusion and,
over time, came to be regarded by many as a scientific means of explanation.
The delineation and transcription of languages divided people into ethnic
groups that rapidly developed their own values, practices, and histories.
During this period, Christianity spread up the coast and into the interior.
Many converts adopted the Christian beliefs and practices brought to Africa
from Europe whereas others adapted them to local conditions. In some areas
class-consciousness grew in importance whereas gender relations, based on
the social practices associated with sexual difference, underwent extensive
change. As the labor market expanded, many young African men returned
home with wages and freedoms that challenged the gerontocratic structure
of rural life.
For many, the forced march of progress quickened the rhythm of existence
and undermined the stability of an older, more secure world. Original
answers had to be found to new problems that affected the most isolated
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villages as much as they did the urban centers. Perhaps most notably,
economic change and movement started to give a unity to the extended
spaces that would one day find a political coherence as South Africa.
CONFLICT ON THE CAPE’S EASTERN FRONTIER
A brief period of peace came to the troubled area east of the Fish River
during the late 1830s and early 1840s. The influence of humanitarians on
the British government had caused the annexation of the area between the
Fish and Kei rivers to be rescinded, after which direct rule was limited to
amaMfengu immigrants settled by the British in the vicinity of Fort Peddie.
Elsewhere, a series of treaties governed the relations between the British
colonial government and the leaders of independent Xhosa and Griqua
communities. These treaties deflected the Boers’ drive for land away from
the coastal plain to the dry interior, where they settled alongside immigrant
Griqua communities and native Sotho-Tswana speakers. The treaties also
placed the onus on the remaining white farmers to protect their herds and
prohibited them from sending armed commandos to retrieve their stolen
cattle or to extort compensation from frontier chiefs. The British further
consolidated their recognition of Xhosa sovereignty by installing diplo-
matic agents, without the support of soldiers or police on the chiefs’ lands,
to oversee the application of the treaties.1 This sudden reversal of policy
underlined the tension between direct rule and assimilation, on the one
hand, and various shades of indirect rule and territorial separation, on the
other. It was to color life on this frontier over the next forty years by juxta-
posing a policy of economic and cultural intercourse with that of intrusive
military rule. The one was a cheap means of colonizing the consciousness
of the amaXhosa; but its results were less immediately visible than those
imposed by military conquest. The Cape’s frontier politics would slew
between these two poles throughout the period covered by this chapter.2
Powerful commercial interests wanted a stronger British presence on the
frontier, as an army consumed local goods created a climate of confidence for
investment and immigration and, in general, was expected to advance the
interests of the settlers. Many farmers had benefited from slave compensa-
tion payments and the availability of cheap land vacated by Dutch-speaking
emigrants in the mid-to-late 1830s. When the price of wool boomed in the
1J. B. Peires, The House of Phalo ( Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981), pp. 119–21; John
Frye (Ed.), The War of the Axe and the Xhosa bible: The journal of the Rev. J.W. Applewood
(Cape Town: C. Struik, 1971).
2A point particularly made by T. Keegan, Colonial South Africa and the origins of the Racial
order (Cape Town: David Philip, 1996).
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early 1840s, and with it the cost of land, these farmers called on govern-
ment to abandon the treaty system and annex unproductive African lands.
They had strong ties to commercial interests in garrison towns along the
frontier and, being mainly British settlers, had stronger links to govern-
ment than the established Boer farmers. As their confidence grew with
their wealth, these sheep farmers exercised an increasing influence on the
administration.3
Metropolitan interests were also changing at this time. The humani-
tarian lobby declined in importance when slavery finally came to an end
throughout the empire in 1838. The mighty experiment engendered by
the costly liberation of slaves seemed to falter and fail as workers left the
West Indian plantations and the price of sugar soared in Britain, and when
free traders sought to open the British market to sugar produced by slaves
in Cuba and Brazil, humanitarians found themselves politically marginal-
ized. Intellectuals like Carlyle and Dickens would soon pour scorn on the
hypocrisy of the “telescopic philanthropy” that favored inscrutable pagans
in foreign lands rather than the poor at home. The humanitarians at the
Cape had advocated the adoption of a package of freedoms by native peo-
ples. These included freedom from slavery and servitude, free enterprise
and free trade, freedom of religion and worship. But an integral part of
this package was freedom from what was seen as the dark superstitions of
tribal life, such as polygamy and bridewealth, and from dancing and the
consumption of liquor. Most Africans found it difficult to abandon customs
that, in the case of bridewealth, provided the payments needed for a son
to marry and establish his own homestead. Through the consumption of
liquor, and by participating in dancing, people constructed community ties
that extended beyond those of kinship. For many, the power of ancestors or
witches seemed more immediate than the interventions of a transcendent
Supreme Being. However, the humanitarians saw these practices in starkly
different ways. Bridewealth and polygamy enslaved African women, drink-
ing and dancing were considered to be signs of ascendant savagery, and
witchcraft and ancestor worship were products of diabolical agency. When
Africans refused to abandon these practices and beliefs, or when Christian
converts slid back into the dark maw of paganism, humanitarians experi-
enced a sense of betrayal. The refusal of Africans to accept the leadership of
the missionaries, or their cultural absolutism, would gradually undermine
the strength of the humanitarian movement at the Cape.4
3B. le Cordeur, The Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, 1820–1854 (New York: Oxford
Univeristy Press, 1981).
4L. Switzer, Power and resistance in an African Society: the Ciskei Xhosa and the Making of
South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1993), pp. 115–35.
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These changes reverberated on the eastern frontier as early as 1839
when an impetuous British colonel, John Hare, replaced Stockenstrom as
lieutenant-governor. They grew in magnitude as the influence of James
Read was all but effaced by a new generation of missionaries that, led by
Henry Calderwood, threatened to impose Christianity on the amaXhosa by
force. The decline of the humanitarian lobby also was felt at Cape Town
where aging liberals like John Philip and his son-in-law, John Fairbairn,
mounted little resistance when, in July 1844, Hare proposed a military
reoccupation of the lands west of the Kei. Two months later a new gover-
nor, Lieutenant-General Sir Peregrine Maitland, finally annulled the treaty
system and allowed farmers once again to follow their stolen cattle. At the
same time, he prohibited independent Xhosa chiefs from applying tribal
law and custom to Christians living in their areas.
By extending the thin wedge of colonial rule across the Fish River in this
manner, Maitland effectively brought the dynamics of conflict back to the
frontier. The vicious cycle of drought, cattle rustling, and armed reprisals
grew during the summer of 1845–46 when the rains failed to fall. When a
Xhosa rescue party freed a prisoner accused of stealing an axe, the British
sent a force of regulars, Cape Mounted Rifles and colonial militia across the
Fish River. The Seventh Frontier War marked a new level of viciousness on
the frontier. The amaXhosa were far better armed, albeit with old flintlock
guns, than a decade earlier. They fought out of desperation to prevent the
British from expelling them from their lands and out of fear that they would
be broken up, like the Khoekhoen, and scattered across the farms, like the
amaMfengu. They tortured and killed prisoners, mutilated the corpses of
their enemies and, when they crossed the frontier, burned settler homes.
In their turn, the British mobilized the biggest army ever assembled in
South Africa, about 14,000 men, of whom regulars made up less than one-
third. Most of the fighting fell to amaMfengu and Khoekhoe auxiliaries,
based on the Indian “Sepoy” model, or to colonists who despised inexperi-
enced imperial troops. During the fighting, British commanders refused to
extend the concept of chivalry to what they saw as a barbarous enemy and
pursued an active strategy of burning Xhosa homes, seizing cattle, and
destroying food stores.5
This scorched earth policy brought the amaXhosa to the edge of starva-
tion and, without the logistics needed to pursue the war, immobilized their
fighters. As the amaNgqika entered the hungry period before the rains,
first Maqoma and then Sandile sued for peace. But without a clear military
5N. Mostert, Frontiers: The Epic of South Africa’s Creation and Tragedy of the Xhosa People
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), pp. 874, 878, 896, 899–90; Peires, House of Phalo,
pp. 153–8.
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victory, the British were unable to end the war. In the face of continuing
Xhosa resistance, particularly from the amaNdlambe who crossed the Kei
with impunity, the secretary of state for the colonies, Lord Grey, turned to
a policy of military rule and cultural assimilation. When a new governor,
Sir Henry Pottinger, arrived at the Cape to implement this policy, he was
persuaded by the settler elite to force the amaXhosa across the Kei River.
However, he had neither the means nor the ability to achieve this and was
soon replaced by Sir Harry Smith, the veteran soldier who saw discipline,
rather than diplomacy, as the solution to the frontier problem.6
Smith’s objective was to pacify and subdue the amaXhosa in the shortest
time possible. In December 1847, he threatened and humiliated a gathering
of Xhosa chiefs, warning them of the consequences of taking up arms
again. He then brought the territory between the Fish and Keiskamma
rivers into the Cape Colony as the district of Victoria East. The amaXhosa
were expelled from this area and their land was either settled by Mfengu
or Khoekhoe immigrants or it was sold to sheep farmers, many of whom
came from the Albany district. Africans who chose to reside on farms
owned by settlers or missionaries were expected to conform to the values
and practices of British civilization. Although cultural assimilation proved
the rule in the Cape, Smith introduced a form of martial law, combined
with indirect rule, in the territory between the Keiskamma and the Kei (the
eastern section of D’Urban’s old province of Queen Adelaide) that he named
British Kaffraria. In this Crown Colony, the amaXhosa were squeezed into
reserves, or rural locations, and subjected to a head tax. Humanitarians
raised little objection to these policies, at least partly because they were
coming to see the imposition of British civilization as the only means of
assuring the freedoms associated with Christianity and commerce. Smith
rewarded their inactivity by bullying the chiefs into prohibiting polygamy
and witchcraft, and by placing the resolution of important contraventions
of the law in the hands of military courts or magistrates who ruled alongside
the chiefs.
The position of the Kat River settlement was soon threatened by the
flagging energy of the humanitarian lobby and the turnaround in British
opinion that allowed this expansion of the colony. During the Seventh
Frontier War, the settlement’s position as a buffer against Xhosa expansion
had been underlined when large numbers of men were conscripted into the
British army. But following the incorporation of Victoria East into the Cape
Colony, the Kat River settlement lost much of this military function and
the weapons of its occupants were called in. At the same time, amaMfengu
6A. Lester, Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-century South Africa and Britain
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), Chapter 6.
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displaced by white farmers in Victoria East, and amaXhosa looking for
work, or pastures for their cattle, started to crowd into the area. Already
a dumping ground for displaced peoples, the Kat River was unable to
accommodate these new immigrants. Poverty in the area grew, particularly
because the settlement’s farmers were unable to sell their land on the open
market or acquire the mortgages and capital needed to convert to sheep
farming. White settlers traced the rise in cattle rustling to the anonymous
newcomers and, ever critical of the endemic poverty in the area, called
for the Kat River settlement to be disbanded as a distinct, self-governing
territory under the tutelage of the LMS. The government responded to
these requests when, during the harsh winter of 1850, police evicted what
they regarded as illegal immigrants from the settlement. For the Kat River
farmers, this seemed to presage their future if, through discussions entered
into at the Cape, Britain agreed to hand the government of the colony to
the settlers.7
Matters came to a head along the frontier when the amaXhosa, squeezed
into locations and menaced by drought, began to respond to the messages
of a prophet, Mlanjeni, who traced the ills of his people to witchcraft. If
the amaXhosa sacrificed their dun-colored cattle, he promised, the English
would disappear. Smith returned to the frontier to address the chiefs; but
when Sandile failed to attend a meeting, he deposed the Ngqika chief in
October 1850 and replaced him with a government magistrate, Charles
Brownlee. This extension of direct rule brought the amaXhosa into open
rebellion. Through their improved proficiency in the handling of firearms,
they were able to inflict considerable casualties on British troops. The war
spread as the amaXhosa mobilized the support of kinsmen living as tenants
on farms in the frontier districts, as well as Thembu fighters living to the
west of the Kei. It took a new and more serious direction when a large section
of disaffected coloreds from the Kat River settlement, as well as deserters
from the Cape Mounted Rifles, took up arms against their erstwhile British
allies. The paternalism of their British officers and the racial abuse of a
growing stratum of colonial society had caused these men of Khoekhoe and
mixed race descent to defend their patriarchal honor and, at the same time,
to fight for the preservation of the last vestiges of a Hottentot culture and
identity.8
7T. Kirk, “The Cape economy and the expropriation of the Kat river Settlement, 1846–
1853,” in S. Marks and A. Atmore (Eds.), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa
(London: Longman, 1980), pp. 226–46.
8E. Elbourne, Blood Ground. Colonialism, Missions, and the Contest for Christianity in the Cape
Colony and Britain, 1799–1853 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002),
pp. 58–61; R. Ross, “The Kat river Rebellion and Khoikhoi nationalism: the fate of an
ethnic identification,” Kronos, 24, 1997.
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The Eighth Frontier War was drawn out, marked by numerous frightful
atrocities, a high loss of life, and a growing racial hatred. The British
soldiers’ grisly practice of taking trophy skulls from their enemies increased
markedly at this time, at least partly because these objects had become items
of phrenological study. This callousness was repaid in full by the Xhosa
practice of torturing captured soldiers to death and dismembering their
corpses.9 The war lasted for twenty-seven months, required the presence of
almost 9,000 British regulars, and cost the lives of some 16,000 amaXhosa.
The Eighth Frontier War also led to the recall of Sir Harry Smith, the public
execution of Kat River rebels, and the breakup of their settlement. It finally
came to an end when, in February 1853, the British withdrew the order of
deposition on Sandile. However, whereas the Ngqika chief was restored to
his prewar position, his people were excluded from some of the most fertile
land in British Kafraria. The fears of the Kat River rebels, that they would
be disadvantaged by responsible government, materialized when the new
representative government passed a Masters and Servants Law in 1856 that
treated defaulting workers as criminals.10
The deprivation caused by the Eighth Cape Frontier (or Mlanjeni’s) War
grew more serious when an epidemic of lungsickness tore through the Xhosa
herds in 1855 and the maize crop faltered due to excessive rain and insect
infestation. These reverses undermined the structure of Xhosa society and
left it open to extremist solutions. In April 1856, Nongqawuse, a young
woman of about fifteen, had a dream in which a New People promised
to come to the rescue of the amaXhosa but only if they destroyed their
contaminated cattle and goods. Nongqawuse’s vision combined traditional
forms of divination and ways of purifying society through sacrifice with
Christian ideas of resurrection and the battle between good and evil. When
lungsickness ravaged the cattle herds to the east of the Kei, the prophecy
took on a new urgency, and Sahili called on the chiefs of the Gcaleka
amaXhosa to follow Nongqawuse’s instructions. On the eastern side of
the Kei, Sandile originally adopted the position of a passive unbeliever;
but as the lungsickness destroyed his cattle he was driven to adopt the
9Mostert, Frontiers, pp. 1040, 1051–3, 1077, 1083, 1096–7, 1102, 1117, 1142, 1152–3;
A. Bank, “Of ‘Native Skulls’ and ‘Noble Caucasians’: Phrenology in Colonial South
Africa,” JSAS, 22(3), (1996), p. 401. On warfare more generally, see C. Crais, White
Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-Industrial South Africa: The Making of the Colonial
Order in the Eastern Cape, 1770–1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
pp. 173–88.
10The act would be amended in 1873, 1874, and 1875. This law replaced the Masters,
Servants and Apprentices Ordinance of 1841; it would remain on the statute book
until 1974. S. van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa (London: Frank Cass, 1942),
pp. 34–8.
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position of an active believer. Xhosa society was divided between “soft”
believers (amathamba) who awaited the coming millennium and “hard”
unbelievers (amagogotya) whom they held responsible for its delayed arrival.
Many people refused to sow crops in the spring of 1856 in anticipation
of the Resurrection day due to arrive in the coming months. But by the
following winter the New People had still not arrived, food stocks were
depleted or destroyed, and soon people started to die. Hunger and exposure
eventually killed between 35,000 and 50,000 amaXhosa in this “national
suicide” and forced perhaps 150,000 to leave their land in search of food.
As many as 60,000 starving amaXhosa crossed into the Cape Colony in
search of work. Sir George Grey’s government attempted to control this
immigration in 1857 through legislation requiring work-seekers to register
at magistrate’s offices where their contracts were attested. At the same time,
it became a criminal offence for “Kafirs or other Native Foreigners” to enter
the colony without a pass.11 With their lands drained of population and
their society shattered, the amaXhosa could only look on as the governor
of the Cape, Sir George Grey, opened British Kaffraria to white settlement.
German mercenaries, who had fought for the British during the Crimean
War, and later German peasants were settled in the area where they estab-
lished small towns with names like Stutterheim, Berlin, Braunschweig, and
Hamburg. Although the Xhosa cattle killing should be viewed, as J. B.
Peires suggests, as “a popular mass movement of a truly national character,”
it was an event that advanced the interests of the British far more than any
military victory.12
Far from the violent upheavals on the eastern frontier, Cape Town’s mer-
chants drew some benefit from the supply to British armies of food and
equipment. By the early 1840s, Cape Town was a recognizably British colo-
nial town with a population of more than 30,000. In 1846, gas lighting
was introduced and, two years later, the town welcomed its first Anglican
bishop, Robert Gray, who encouraged the establishment of church schools
based on the British model. The introduction of civil service exams encour-
aged the spread of formal schooling and caused several Dutch families
to adopt the language and culture of the English. Local knowledge was
reflected in newspapers and bookshops that tied Cape Town into an empire
of learning dominated by Britain. The Cape Monthly Magazine, established
11J. Peires, The Dead Will Arise ( Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1989), pp. 249–50; van der
Horst, Native Labour, pp. 29–34.
12J. Peires, The Dead Will Arise. In 1969, Monica Wilson judged the cattle killing a
“pagan reaction,” Oxford History of South Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969),
pp. 256–60, while, thirty years earlier, C. W. de Kiewiet declared it “an incredible
madness,” Cambridge History of the British Empire, 8, p. 403.
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in 1859, mixed politics and history with investigations of climate, irriga-
tion, and evolution. The town reflected a new self-confidence in its sub-
stantial buildings and original architecture. In 1859, a handsome edifice
was erected, in the Greek-revival style, on the north side of old Com-
pany Gardens to house the South African Public Library and the museum.
These institutions provided employment for well-connected intellectuals
who brought the ideals of metropolitan scholarship to the Cape. Ernst
Haekel’s cousin, Wilhelm Bleek, initiated research into the languages and
customs of the Bushmen. His collaborator and sister-in-law, Lucy Lloyd,
would continue this work after his death in 1875 and, particularly through
her Folk-lore Journal, provide inspiration for some of the first ethnographic
essays to appear in South Africa.13 Robert Owen supported the candidature
of the ornithologist Edgar Layard for the post of museum curator, a position
he occupied from 1855 to 1872, when the entomologist Roland Trimen
replaced him. The South African College was established in 1841 on the
grounds formerly occupied by the zoo at the southern end of Government
Avenue. Housed in a single building, the institution was initially little
more than a center for examinations and the conferring of degrees. But
when the college became the University of the Cape of Good Hope in
1875, two new buildings were erected and, in 1881, a chemistry labora-
tory. The university complex at the one end of Government Avenue, and
the museum–library at the other, formed the intellectual heart of the city.
The establishment in 1877 of a South African Philosophical Society, with
its own transactions, secured the link to metropolitan sites of knowledge.
Grahamstown formed another core of settler intellectual activity with its
own, Albany, museum (founded in 1855), public library, and short-lived
Eastern Province Monthly Magazine (1856–58). Collections were built on the
work of men in the field who, like the frontier entomologist and botanist
Mary Barber, were sometimes women.14 During the late 1830s, Andrew
Geddes Bain, while building roads in the Fort Beaufort district for the
Royal Engineers, discovered the fossilized bones of prehistoric (mammal-
like) reptiles that Owen, in London, identified as dicynodants from the
13R. Thornton, “‘This dying out Race’: W. H. I. Bleek’s “Approach to the languages
of South Africa,” Social Dynamics, 9, 1983; A. Bank “Evolution and racial theory: the
hidden side of Wilhelm Bleek,” South African Historical Journal, 43, 2000; Mario di
Gregorio, “Reflections of a non-political naturalist: Ernst Haeckel, Wilhelm Bleek,
Friedrich Mu¨ller and the meaning of language,” Journal of the History of Biology, 35,
2002.
14W. Beinart, “Men, Science, Travel and Nature in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century
Cape,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 24, 1998; A. Cohen, “Mary Elizabeth Barber,
the Bowkers, and South African Prehistory,” South African Archaeological Bulletin, LIV,
170, 1999.
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Permo-Triassic Age preceding that of the dinosaurs. The work of these
collectors helped the metropolitan experts uncover and explain the vast
diversity of species and gauge the enormous depth of time.15 But these
colonial footsoldiers of science were often experts themselves who, through
their close contacts with the metropolitan world, brought to the Cape new
ways of understanding the natural and human environment.
Much of this work had unexpected political consequences. First, Euro-
pean scientists saw their findings and explanations as universal and brushed
aside those of the indigenous inhabitants. Second, the discoveries of geol-
ogists, palaeontologists, botanists, and zoologists showed Africa to be
an ancient continent harboring primitive species made extinct in more
advanced parts of the world. Third, these new ideas rapidly influenced
the way scientists looked at the human population. Missionary linguists
made tremendous advances in these years; the New Testament appeared
in Setswana in 1840, isiXhosa in 1846, and South Sesotho in 1855. The
following year, Bleek grouped these, and other, languages into a new clas-
sificatory category: the Bantu family of languages.16 The missionaries’
linguistic work was paralleled by their attempts to order and understand
the indigenous peoples of South Africa. By midcentury, their monographs
and essays had developed an ethnographic genre that divided the native
population into a clear patchwork of tribes. These advances allowed Gustav
Fritsch to produce, in 1872, the first ethnographic survey of the Bantu
peoples of South Africa.17 This reification of linguistic categories into
tribes and then into an overarching social group, “the Bantu,” provided
science with categories that could be examined and analyzed in the manner
15The fossil collections sent to the British Museum by Bain are still being identified and
have, only recently, helped scientists uncover the catastrophe that destroyed the trilobites
and most other forms of life some 250 million years ago, M. Benton, When Life Nearly
Died: the greatest extinction of all time (London: Thames and Hudson, 2003), pp. 206–8;
S. Dubow, “Earth history, Natural history, and Prehistory at the Cape, 1860–1875,”
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2004.
16W. Bleek, “South African languages and books,” Cape Monthly Magazine, 3, (1858),
p. 325. W. H. I. Bleek, Comparative Grammar of South African Languages (London: Trubner,
and Cape Town: Juta), I (1862) and II (1869).
17Starting with works like J. Campbell’s Travels in South Africa: Being a Narrative of a
Second Journey in the Interior of That Country (London: Westley, 1822), pp. 193–222,
J. Philip’s Researches in South Africa Illustrating the Civil, Moral, and Religious Condition
of Native Tribes (London: James Ducan, 1828), and R. Moffat’s Missionary Labours and
Scenes in Southern Africa (London: Snow, 1842), pp. 234–55. See especially E. Casalis, The
Basutos: or Twenty-three years in South Africa (published in French, 1859, translated in
London, 1861); W. Holden, The Past and Future of the Kaffir Races (reprinted Cape Town:
C. Struik, 1963); H. Callaway, The Religious System of the AmaZulu (Springvale: Blair,
1868–70). G. Fritsch, Die Eingeborenen Sud-afrika’s (Breslau: Hirt, 1872).
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of plants and animals. Much of this work portrayed Khoesan and Bantu
languages as little developed, weak, or feminine whereas the ethnographic
work often sought to find the origins of language, religion, or the family
in the primitive customs of African people living in a land that seemed
to have undergone little change since the beginning of time. So, whereas
this knowledge ordered and domesticated the human environment and
gave government the intellectual resources needed to administer and con-
trol tribal peoples, it also extended the social distance between whites and
Africans. It also portrayed colonized people as tribesmen living at an early
stage of evolution or as dying out or inferior races in need of Christian
care and colonial tuition. History as a discipline tended to confirm these
ideas, particularly at the end of the 1870s and early 1880s, as the field
moved in a professional direction following the appointment of the first
state archivists.18
The intrusion of the state into the daily lives of individuals was particu-
larly noticeable during the governorship of Sir George Grey, who replaced
military rule with enlightened civil administration.19 This was reflected in
his labor legislation as much as in the construction of the Roeland Street
jail in Cape Town and the impressive government hospitals erected in the
capital and in King William’s Town. It also was reflected in a campaign
to build and extend schools, most notably Lovedale (established on the
eastern frontier in 1841) and Zonnebloem (in Cape Town), and to provide
an education for young women.20
When a hard road was built across the sandy Cape Flats in 1845, Cape
Town’s gaze turned hesitantly from its old, maritime hinterland and looked
northward to the interior along new lines of contact, control, and commerce.
New roads linked Cape Town to its hinterland, encouraged regular omnibus
services with rural towns, and facilitated the movement of agricultural
18H. C. V. Leibbrant was appointed colonial archivist and parliamentary librarian in
January 1881. G. M. Theal had started to work through, and order, state archives a
few years earlier. C. C. Saunders, The Making of the South African Past (Cape Town:
David Philip, 1988), pp. 12–14. On the earlier historiography, cf. Robert Ross, “Donald
Moodie and the origins of South African historiography,” in Beyond the Pale: Essays on
the History of Colonial South Africa (Hanover and London: Wesleyan University Press and
University Press of New England, 1993).
19The ambivalence of this term is reflected in historians’ starkly divergent opinions of
Grey. The role played by the institutions of the British colonial state in filtering power
throughout civil society is stressed by C. Crais, White Supremacy and Black Resistance.
20D. Gaitskell, “At Home with hegemony: Coercion and consent in African girls’ education
for domesticity in South Africa before 1910,” in D. Engels and S. Marks (Eds.), Contesting
Colonial Hegemony (London: British Academic Press, 1994); N. Erlank “‘Raising up the
degraded daughters of Africa’: the provision of education for Xhosa women in the
mid-nineteenth century,” South African Historical Journal, 43, (2000).
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produce. Secure mountain passes soon allowed these lines of contact, control,
and commerce to extend into the interior. The first railways were built in
the early 1860s and, once diamonds were discovered, lines were extended
to Beaufort West and Cradock in 1881. Kimberley would be reached four
years later. By 1850, it took three days for troop reinforcements to travel
from Cape Town to East London by coastal steamer; and a further day to
reach King William’s Town overland. Steamships reduced the length of
the voyage from Britain to the Cape by a third and a telegraph linked
the two countries for the first time in 1885. Much of Cape Town’s energy
grew out of a new political confidence. Colonists were able to exercise some
political influence through road boards, school committees, and church
synods. In 1846, they were able to enter into electoral politics for the first
time with the establishment of a two-tiered form of municipal government
dominated by wealthy town notables.21 Three years later, the municipality
brought together various groups calling for representative government
when, in direct opposition to popular wishes, the metropolitan government
attempted to bring convicts to the Cape to work on roads and other public
works. The broad agitation provoked by this issue isolated the governor
and his conservative allies, as well as political leaders, in the eastern district
who feared the dominance of Cape Town and, in the wake of the Kat River
rebellion, an unrestricted franchise. The constitution passed in 1853 was
the product of notions of liberal democracy imported from Britain as well
as economic interests that bound white merchants and black peasants into
a single, prosperous class.22 It introduced a color-blind franchise open to
all males who earned £50 a year or owned property worth £25. They were
not required to be literate. Men who met the low franchise qualification
were eligible for election to the House of Assembly; but a relatively high
property qualification (£2,000 fixed or £4,000 unfixed property) restricted
entrance to the Upper House, or Legislative Council.
The first representative government was elected in 1854 but, for the
next twenty years, failed to raise substantive new issues, beyond the com-
petition between eastern and western districts or the shape of the budget,
and succeed in mobilizing few voters, whether black or Dutch, in rural
areas. For these reasons, responsible government came quietly to the Cape
in 1872 when the colony was, for the first time, able to choose its own
21V. Bickford-Smith, Ethnic Pride and Racial Prejudice in Victorian Cape Town (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
22Historians remain divided on the benefits brought to the black population by the fran-
chise. Compare Mostert, Frontiers, pp. 1160, 1273, 1275 with Trapido, “‘The friends
of the Natives’: merchants, peasants and the political and ideological structure of lib-
eralism in the Cape, 1854–1910,” in Marks and Atmore (Eds.), Economy and Society in
Pre-Industrial South Africa, pp. 267–8.
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prime minister. A large and imposing building was constructed, between
1875–84, to house the new parliament. Situated at the head of Adderley
Street, the main thoroughfare in Cape Town (named after a member of
the British parliament opposed to the settlement of convicts at the Cape),
this building, and the neighboring slave lodge turned supreme court,
looked across government avenue to the library–museum, modeled on the
Fitzwilliam Museum in Cambridge, and the Anglican cathedral, built in
the early 1830s after the model of St. Pancras Church in London. The four
institutions seemed to unite politics, law, knowledge, and religion in an
apex of settler power.
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The elected government was expected to contribute to the defense and
expansion of the colony. Soon after the Xhosa cattle killing, Thembu and
Mfengu emigrants crossed the Kei where they came into conflict with the
local Gcaleka amaXhosa. As the fighting intensified, the British came to
the aid of their allies and pushed Sahili and his followers further eastward.
A decade later, in the mid-1860s, Thembu and Mfengu immigrants had,
with the encouragement of their British allies, occupied the heart of the old
Gcaleka territory. This movement of peoples created new frontier districts
on the eastern side of the Kei: Emigrant Thembuland in the foothills of the
Drakensberg, Fingoland, and, when Sahili returned to a severely reduced
area on the coast, Gcalekaland. In 1866, the Cape Colony brought to an
end its long annexation of the Ciskei when it took possession of British
Kaffraria and divided the territory into two districts: East London and King
William’s Town. The Cape’s annexation of this area swelled the numbers
of isiXhosa-speakers in its population and, the following year, this change
was reflected in a redrafted pass law. This no longer regarded “Kaffirs” as
automatic foreigners and, as the need for land and labor changed after the
discovery of diamonds, prepared the way for the piecemeal annexation of
the Transkein territories.23
The last Cape Frontier war took place in 1877–78 as the amaXhosa
mounted a final, futile struggle against British rule. The cost of this war,
which resulted in the annexation of Fingoland, and particularly the disarm-
ing of the Basotho two years later, fell heavily on the Cape’s taxpaying voters.
This increased the disaffection of Dutch farmers who were suffering from
free-trade policies and a growing dependence on imperial banks. In 1879,
J.H. Hofmeyr started a political movement aimed at protecting the inter-
ests of largely Dutch farmers while S. J. du Toit established a political party,
the Afrikaner Bond, and launched the first Afrikaans language movement.
Although Cape Muslims had written some of the earliest Afrikaans texts
in Arabic, they were not welcomed by du Toit’s followers.24 The more
moderate Hofmeyr initially stressed the importance of Dutch and, when
he took over the Bond a few years later, successfully established the right
to use the language in Parliament, the civil service, and the higher courts.
However, his mobilization of Dutch-speaking colonists did not seek to
23C. C. Saunders, “The Annexation of the Transkei,” in C. C. Saunders and R. Derricourt
(Eds.), Beyond the Cape Frontier: Studies in the History of the Transkei and Ciskei (London:
Longman, 1974).
24A. Davids, “‘My Religion is Superior to the Law’: The Survival of Islam at the Cape
of Good Hope,” in Y. da Costa and A. Davids, (Eds.), Pages from Cape Muslim History
(Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1994) pp. 12, 68, 152; A. van Selms, “n Arabiese
Grammatika in Afrikaans,” Tydskrif vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 16(1), (1956).
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bring about confrontation with English-speakers, and Hofmeyr and his
followers remained staunch members of the British Empire.25
Another consequence of the last frontier war was the transportation of
prisoners to the Western Cape where they labored on farms and railways.
Until this time, the descendants of slaves brought from Mozambique,
Madagascar, and other areas of Africa constituted the major part of the
black population in the Western Cape. The anti-slavery squadron estab-
lished at Simonstown in 1808 liberated about 2,000 slaves in the first two
decades of the nineteenth century and, between 1839–46, as the inden-
tures of freed slaves expired, and the need for labor soared, brought another
4,000 of these “prize negroes” to Cape Town. The introduction of assisted
immigration from Britain brought an end to this scheme; but the need
for labor rose sharply after the discovery of diamonds and, between 1876
and 1883, another 3,200 contracted laborers were brought from southern
Mozambique to the Cape. These men soon contributed to the ethnic mosaic
clustered around churches like St. Paul’s, constructed on the slopes of Sig-
nal Hill in 1880 and, later, St. Phillip’s in Woodstock.26 Islam flourished
in the neighboring Bo-Kaap where a Turkish missionary of Kurdish ori-
gins, Abu Bakr Effendi, helped revitalize the religion after his arrival in
Cape Town in 1862. The wealth and confidence of the Muslims grew, like
that of most sectors of the population, with the growth of the economy
occasioned by the diamond discoveries. In the 1884 House of Assembly
elections, the Muslims indicated, for the first time, their ability to influence
local politics.27 Meanwhile, much further north in what was to become the
Transvaal, another “ethnic mosaic” was taking place involving Boer and
African communities.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERIOR
From the mid-eighteenth century, the South African central and western
Highveld was destabilized, both politically and economically, by general
conflict among Tswana societies. This uncertainty reached a climax in
the 1820s and 1830s with the invasion of the region by the Ndebele
25H. Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2003),
pp. 212–23.
26Saunders, “‘Free, yet slaves’: Prize Negroes at the Cape revisited,” in N. Worden and
C. Crais (Eds.), Breaking the Chains: Slavery and its legacy in the nineteenth-century Cape
Colony ( Johannesburg: Witswatersrand University Press, 1994); Harries, “Culture and
Classification: a history of the Mozbieker community at the Cape,” Social Dynamics, 26(2),
(2000).
27N. Worden, E. van Heyningen, and V. Bickford-Smith, Cape Town: the Making of a City
(Cape Town: David Philip, 1998), p. 221.
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impis of Mzilikazi, resulting in the physical displacement of thousands of
Sotho-Tswana speaking communities.28 The Africans and the Boers were
pastoral and agricultural societies. Both needed to recover after the equally
disturbing periods of the Ndebele invasion and Great Trek, respectively.
The frontier of Trekker expansion was a volatile region as both the Boers and
the local African populace wanted to gain control over important resources,
particularly land and workers. This situation made for a competitive and
potentially hostile relationship between the Boers and the African groups.
Yet, as will be shown in this chapter and as a number of other works
on the history of the Transvaal have shown, there were also times when
Boers and Africans cooperated and worked together.29 From the late 1970s,
historians have been especially concerned to shade in these specific nuances
and differences, so that we now have a more detailed and complex picture
of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) and how it functioned or failed
to. What becomes manifestly apparent from these analyses is that the
African population was able to dictate, to a significant degree, the nature of
the ZAR.
Following the defeat and expulsion of Mzilikazi and the amaNdebele
in 1837 from what was later to be called the Transvaal, the Voortrekkers
under the leadership of Andries Potgieter proclaimed the area as Boer
territory, by right of conquest. The creation of a new state on the South
African Highveld was an arduous task for the Trekkers due to a number
of problems. From the 1830s, the Voortrekkers on the Highveld lived in
scattered communities in far-flung areas. The problem of such scattered
Boer communities was worsened by disunity, manifested by internal splits.
In April 1844, for example, Potgieter and his followers established a new
Voortrekker “republic” with its own set of rules, the Thirty-Three Articles,
as its basis of government. These articles were basically about issues of
order and security in a fledgling society still grappling with the creation of
a territorial government. As a pointer to the racial policy of the Voortrekkers
to Africans, parts of these articles specifically excluded “half-castes, down
to the tenth degree” while “natives” would “[not] be permitted to take
28This is more detailed in A. Manson, “Conflict in the western highveld/southern Kalahari,”
in C. Hamilton (Ed.), The Mfecane Aftermath ( Johannesburg: Witswatersrand University
Press, 1995), Chapter 13.
29See P. Bonner, Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires ( Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1982);
P. Delius, The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi Polity, the Boers and the British in Nineteenth
Century Transvaal ( Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1982); R. Wagner, “Zoutpansberg: The
Dynamics of a Hunting Frontier,” in Marks and Atmore (Eds.), Economy and Society in
Pre-Industrial South Africa; A. Manson, “The Hurutshe in the Marico District,” Ph.D.
thesis, University of Cape Town (1990).
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up their residence near any townlands to the detriment of the [white]
inhabitants of the town . . .”30
Potgieter stayed briefly at Potchefstroom and in August 1845, he and
his followers left to establish the new settlement of Andries Ohrigstad.
This was partly due to personal ambition, but also in order to establish
a commercial outlet to the Mozambican coast, to ward off Portuguese
territorial ambitions and move beyond the reach of British authority at
the Cape. The Ohrigstad community, however, was faced with problems
such as the tsetse fly, malaria, Portuguese and African opposition, as well
as dissension within its leadership. Consequently, in 1848, Potgieter and a
small following broke away and moved north to found another new settle-
ment, Soutpansberg, leaving J. J. Burgers and others in charge of Ohrigstad.
Some of the Ohrigstad community also moved out to found yet another
new settlement about 10 km to the south, which they named the Republic
of Lydenburg. Another group of Trekkers had struck out to the Madikwe
region where they founded the settlement of Zeerust. Thus, by 1844,
there were four distinct Voortrekker communities. Although all of them
were motivated by the same social, political, and theological concerns,
they were fundamentally disunited and split into factions based on loy-
alty toward certain leaders. Pretorius, for example, had his own following
whereas many other Boers who were opposed to him refused to serve under
him. He eventually settled at what later became Rustenburg. Those who
were loyal to him gradually came to settle in the Magaliesberg, but the
Boers of Ohrigstad, Olifants River, and Derdepoort insisted that they would
never serve under him.
Following an earlier decision to unite, the Potchefstroom and Soutpans-
berg groups formed a united Volksraad at Hekpoort in the Magaliesberg
in 1849. The Volksraad agreed to meet thrice a year. The four Boer com-
munities of Mooi River and the Magaliesberg, Soutpansberg, Lydenburg,
and Madikwe would each have its own commandant–general, but all of
them under one united Volksraad. Whereas the envisaged Volksraad never
met due to lack of a quorum, Pretorius, nevertheless, negotiated the Sand
River Convention in 1852, explained in the following, on behalf of all the
others.
As already indicated previously, initially the Trekkers were only a con-
centration of a few thousand inhabitants in centers far removed from each
other, and it took nearly fifteen years to agree upon the need for, and
basic characteristics of, the ZAR. The Sand River Convention of 1852
had done little to unite the three Boer communities in the area north of
30G. W. Eybers, Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History, 1795–1910
(London: Routledge, 1918), pp. 349–56.
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the Vaal: at Potchefstroom, Lydenburg, and Schoemansdal. The Sand River
Convention granted the Boers the right to govern themselves and buy arms
and ammunition from the British colonies. It also undertook to repudiate
all previous treaties with African communities north of the Vaal and not to
sell arms or ammunition to them.31
Gathered around patriarchal leaders, Boers communities at times re-
sorted to arms to settle their differences. It was only in 1860 that they
were able to form a common government with its own constitution and
infrastructure. Even after this, it took decades to unify and strengthen the
new state and, despite its later resistance to British imperial advancement
and attempts to dismantle it, the ZAR never stamped its authority firmly
over the local black population.32 The policies and laws of the ZAR were
unevenly applied, varying from region to region according to a range
of factors, among them the physical landscape, the nature of the local
economy, the dispersion of disease-free areas, the density of black and
white settlement, and the character of individual leaders, both Boer and
African.
VOORTREKKER APPROPRIATION OF AFRICAN-OCCUPIED LAND
As the new authorities and “owners” of the land in the Transvaal, the
Voortrekkers considered the Africans to be under their jurisdiction. If they
found African-occupied land suitable for their occupation, “the natives
were obliged to either regain possession by purchase or to become farm
servitors.”33 Land in the Transvaal was given to the original Voortrekkers
“on a very generous basis” and, up to 1870, two 6,000-acre farms were
given to each one “as of right.”34 In about 1841, for example, when Paul
Kruger, later president of the ZAR, was only sixteen years old, he was
entitled to choose two farms for himself, one for grazing and another
for growing crops.35 From the 1850s, title-holders such as veldkornets
31Eybers, Select Constitutional Documents, p. 359.
32S. Trapido, “The South African Republic: Class Formation and the State, 1850–1900,”
Collected Seminar Papers on Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, 3
(hereafter SSA). (1971); S. Trapido, “Aspects in the Transition from Slavery to Serfdom:
The South African Republic, 1842–1902,” SSA, 6 (1975); S. Trapido, “Reflections on
Land, Office and Wealth in the South African Republic, 1850–1900,” in Marks and
Atmore (Eds.), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa.
33L. V. Praagh, The Transvaal and Its Mines: The Encyclopaedic History of the Transvaal
( Johannesburg: Praagh and Lloyd, 1906), p. 79.
34Trapido, “Aspects in the transition from slavery to serfdom,” p. 27.
35S. J. P. Kruger, The Memoirs of Paul Kruger, vol. I (London: Unwin 1902), p. 13.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521517942.008
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 14 Dec 2017 at 11:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core
From Colonial Hegemonies to Imperial Conquest, 1840–1880 339
and commandants in particular, were able to acquire “substantial land
holdings” easily. Such officials in positions of power had inside information
about the workings of the land market and therefore could more easily
ensure that their rights or titles were validated. In the 1850s and 1860s,
white officials of the state were paid in land rather than in money because
of the chronic shortage of cash in the ZAR government.36 That is how in
the Lydenburg district, for example, as Peter Delius records, H. Bu¨hrmann
who was landdrost in the period 1849–51 and subsequently member of the
Volksraad had acquired eighteen farms by 1869. But quite apart from state
officials, there were other individuals who acquired incomes from hunting
and trading and then invested them in land as a way of speculation. Thus,
by 1877, one D. J. G. Coetzee, a prominent trader in the eastern ZAR, had
bought and sold seven farms.37
In 1859, land appropriation by the Boers was facilitated further by a
government decision which, in addition to a freehold farm which each
burgher was entitled to, gave each one at least one more quitrent farm.
This decision enabled those in positions of authority and influence to
acquire, as Delius states, “truly massive landholdings.” That is how, for
example, by 1866, one Johannes Vos, then the landdrost clerk to Marthinus
Wesselstroom in the Lydenburg district, had accumulated a staggering 120
farms.38 Although such a large number of farms may have been an exception,
it is nevertheless a pointer to the ease with which Boer individuals of
influence could acquire a lot of farms.
A feature of Boer land acquisition in the Transvaal is that some of it
was passed on to individuals and companies based outside the territory,
notably the Cape and Natal. This incidence became so widespread, at
least in the Lydenburg district, that in 1873 the residents there wrote a
petition to the government complaining against this practice by “people
residing in the neighboring colonies and in Europe who have no interest
in the development of the country . . .”39 The significance of the foregoing
pattern and rate of Boer appropriation of African-occupied land in the
northeastern Transvaal lies in the fact that:
It applied as markedly in areas of predominantly African settlement and within the
domains of effectively independent African polities, and in contested areas, as it did
in zones of white settlement and control . . . Even those societies sufficiently strong
to resist Boer exactions were nonetheless unable to prevent the process whereby
36See Trapido, “Aspects,” 27; Trapido “The South African Republic,” p. 56.
37Delius, The Land, p. 128. 38Delius, The Land, pp. 128–9.
39Quoted in Delius, The Land, p. 129.
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the land upon which they lived was transformed into [white-owned] freehold and
quitrent farms.40
Appropriating land that had Africans already living on it had obvious and
important advantages for the Boers. First, it was likely to be fertile and well
watered. Second, the Africans on it had to pay rent in labor, kind, or cash
as tenants. This general pattern, it should be noted, was very similar to
land appropriation elsewhere in the ZAR, the difference being that in the
western and southern parts, the process occurred earlier.
The missionaries were not to be left out of the ongoing land appropri-
ation. Some began to acquire land from as early as the 1860s. The Rev.
Henri Gonin of the Dutch Reformed Church, for example, bought four
farms for himself in the Pilansberg during the 1860s.41 It is unclear why,
but it may have been “for better security in old age, or simply for sale at a
profit in future.” But, meanwhile, he settled the ex-slave Christian mem-
bers (Oorlams) of his church on one of his four properties, Welgeval. Except
for one other property, Schaapkraal, inherited by his children after his death
in 1915, Gonin eventually sold all of his farms. Similarly, during the 1870s
in the eastern Transvaal, the Berlin Mission Society (BMS) missionary,
Alexander Merensky, personally owned many thousands of acres of land,
whereas the Hermannsburg missionaries in the Rustenburg district also
owned land and farmed, as did the BMS missionaries in nearby Kroondal.
There were various reasons for missionaries owning land. Before the Sec-
ond World War, the BMS missionaries, for example, were paid extremely
small salaries which were, for example, “only a third of what Reformed
and Methodist missionaries were paid” and, therefore, resorted to owning
land, farming, and livestock production to survive as some of them “lived
in great poverty.”42 Whereas missionaries in the Transvaal were involved
in acquiring land for their future security, the fledgling Boer societies were
engaged in processes of both conflict and accommodation with African
societies.
BOER–AFRICAN RELATIONS
Up to the 1880s, incursions into, and settlement in, what later became the
Transvaal resulted neither in an easy victory by, nor a complete dominance of
the Boer colonists over African societies. There was, instead, a complex set of
40Delius, The Land, p. 130.
41B. Mbenga, “The Bakgatla-baga-Kgafela in the Pilanesberg District of the Western
Transvaal, from 1899 to 1931,” Ph.D. thesis, Unisa (1997), p. 213.
42F. Hasselhorn, Mission, Land Ownership and Settlers’ Ideology ( Johannesburg: South African
Council of Churches, 1987), pp. 18–20.
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relations between the two societies, ranging at various times between con-
flict and cooperation. In practice, the existence and continued livelihoods
of the ZAR’s inhabitants were as a result of agreements and compromises
reached in the various districts of the Transvaal by local Boer officials and
African leaders. This did not imply that there was an absence of violence but
rather that such violence was a symptom of the Boers’ inability to impose
their dominance over the local population. Their initial attempts to subju-
gate African societies met with stiff resistance. In the northern Transvaal
during the 1840s, as Delius has shown, the amaNdzundza Ndebele resisted
Boer demands for their labor. With guns acquired through migrant labor,
trade, and raiding, the amaNdzunza successfully beat off Boer attempts to
subdue them. Delius further records that “by the late 1860s, many farmers
[i.e., Boers] who had settled in the environs of the amaNdzundza trekked
away in despair” while “those who remained recognized the authority of the
Ndzundza rulers and paid tribute to them.”43 Following the annexation
of the Transvaal in 1877 and defeat of the Pedi by the British in 1879,
however, the balance of power swung greatly against African states in the
region. Shortly afterward, the amaNdzundza came under the rule of the
ZAR. Subsequently, a combined force of Boers and some African auxiliaries
surrounded the amaNdzundza in a siege that lasted until July 1883, by
which time they had been starved into submission and surrender. To press
their victory home, the Boers torched the Ndzundza capital and imprisoned
most of the ruling family, including Chief Nyabela, in Pretoria.44
Elsewhere in the Transvaal, Boer–African relations followed a similar
pattern. In the Marico district in the early 1850s, as Andrew Manson has
shown, following the continual raiding of cattle on Boer farms and the
killing of three Boers by Bahurutshe, the Boers were forced to abandon
their farms and go “into laager before finally leaving for Potchefstroom
and Magaliesberg in January 1853.”45 Although the Boers returned to the
Marico the following year, instability continued with the murder of several
more of them over the next few years. The ZAR authorities were clearly
unable to dictate terms to the Bahurutshe. In fact, they were too weak to
exert hegemony over the Bahurutshe or any other Tswana community in the
region. This factor and the importance of keeping open the crucial “Hunter’s
Road,” which ran from the Marico north through Tswana territory into
43P. Delius, “The Ndzundza Ndebele: Indenture and the making of ethnic identity, 1883–
1914,” in P. Bonner et al. (Eds.), Holding Their Ground: Class, Locality and Culture in 19th
and 20th Century South Africa ( Johannesburg: Ravan Press and Witwatersrand University
Press, 1989), p. 229.
44Delius, “The Ndzundza Ndebele,” p. 231.
45A. Manson, “The Hurutshe and the Formation of the Transvaal State, 1835–1875,” The
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 25(1) (1992), p. 91.
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Matabeleland, forced the Boers into a relationship of dependence upon
African groups in the western Transvaal as allies.46 This ambivalent Boer–
African relationship of conflict and cooperation was commonplace in the
rest of the Transvaal. In the northern Transvaal, for example, as in the
Marico, African groups such as the Bakopa under Boleu, the amaNdzundza
Ndebele under Mabhogo, and the Bapedi under Sekwati were also initially
able to successfully resist Boer attempts to subjugate or extract forced labor
from them at will.47
Boers and Tswana groups had been allies in a number of ways that were
mutually beneficial. In this relationship, Tswana regiments were used by
Boer commandos as auxiliaries in their many raids against other African
groups in far-flung parts of the Transvaal.48 At a time when the Sand River
Convention of 1852 expressly prohibited Africans from possessing firearms,
the Boer leader, Paul Kruger, allowed Tswana chiefs such as Kgamanyane
of the Bakgatla and Mokgatle of the Bafokeng and their followers to own
guns and participate in profitable ivory trading across the Limpopo River.
Guns were given as a reward for participating in these raids and this
enabled these groups to take part in the still lucrative ivory trade in the
1840s and 1850s. According to the historian Fred Morton, Mokgatle and
Kgamanyane “acquired wealth in cattle, plantations, tools, buildings, and
dependants.”49 In the northern Transvaal, Chief Sekwati had a similar
relationship with the Trekker leaders, particularly Potgieter, “which was
reflected in the mounting of joint hunts and raids.”50 As in the Eastern
Cape during an earlier period, the leaders of immigrant and indigenous
communities often exploited the open nature of the frontier to the benefit
of their two communities. Another way to accumulate wealth was through
trade, particularly in liquor and guns. Through this trade in guns, Africans
were able to partake more fully in the slaughter of game that was threatening
several species of animals with extinction. Independent chiefs also were able
to arm their followers with these guns and either bought powder or acquired
the skills needed to manufacture it. In the north, Boers gave guns to local
hunters during the summer months when malaria increased the dangers
of hunting, and tsetse fly prevented the use of horses and wagons. Black
46Manson, “The Hurutshe,” p. 91. 47Delius, The Land, pp. 36–7.
48About Voortrekker military expeditions using surrogate African groups against indepen-
dent African polities in the Transvaal during the nineteenth century, see, for example,
War Office General Staff, The Native Tribes of the Transvaal (London: War Office, 1905),
pp. 100–6; J. Meintjes, President Paul Kruger: A Biography (London: Cassell, 1974), pp.
64–7; M. Juta, Pace of the Ox: A Life of Paul Kruger (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau,
1975), pp. 46–55.
49Morton, “Slave Raiding,” p. 107. 50Delius, The Land, p. 37.
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hunters, known as swart skuts, acquired guns in this way and eventually
grew strong enough to turn on their erstwhile employers and, in 1867,
eject them from their northern capital of Schoemansdal. The northern
frontier then retreated southward to leave the area immediately south of
the Soutpansberg in the hands of Joao Albasini, a Portuguese trader by
origin, and a disparate group of immigrants, many of them his followers.
Pushed from the coast by famine, war, and disease, these immigrants were
attracted to the transfrontiersman by his control of a profitable trade in
slaves and ivory.51
On this frontier, isolated Boer communities seemed to experience a
“reverse colonization” as they came to depend for their survival on African
allies and assistants. With growing frequency, missionaries came across
whites who, separated from their institutions and beliefs, employed slaves
and traded in “black ivory.”52 European immigrants like Coenraad de Buys
and Joao Albasini had married Africans, or taken local concubines, and
they, together with other people of European descent, consulted rainmak-
ers, diviners, and healers, or personally threw the bones.53 The mode of pro-
duction practised on this impoverished frontier seemed to have regressed
after 1867 from a form of settled farming to a shiftless, itinerant hunting.
Whites trekked after migrating game, lived from their rifles, and squatted
in the same insalubrious conditions as the natives. The sight of a black ser-
vant teaching his master to read appalled one Swiss missionary, for whom
this image encapsulated the astonishing ignorance to which the Boers had
reverted in this northern wilderness.54
In areas where the Boers settled in greater numbers, they were likely to
impose a more servile relationship on the local population. From the early
years of their settlement in the Transvaal, the Voortrekkers were faced with
what they perceived to be an acute shortage of labor. In the Cape where they
earlier came from, they had built up a tradition of dependence upon slave
labor. But such labor was not readily available in their new environment
51J. C. A. Boeyens, “‘Black ivory’: The Indenture System and Slavery in Zoutpansberg,”
in Slavery in South Africa, in E. Eldredge and F. Morton (Eds.), Slavery in South Africa:
Captive Labor on the Dutch Frontier (Boulder, CO: Westview Press and Pietermaritzburg:
University of Natal Press, 1994).
52Boeyens, “Black ivory,” pp. 195–7.
53Swiss Mission Archives, Lausanne: 8.10.B Paul Berthoud to Mission Council, 28 Decem-
ber 1876 and 22 December 1877; Bulletin de la Mission vaudoise, 5 (1875), p. 73. Nouvelles
de nos missionaires 10, 1, 1887, 8. Arthur Grandjean would refer to Albasini as an “African-
ised Portuguese,” “L’Invasion des Zoulous dans le Sud-Est Africain,” Le Globe, 36 (1897),
p. 20.
54P. Berthoud, Ne`gres Gouamba (Lausanne, 1896), p. 20. On the Cape’s eastern frontier
the British prosecuted farmers who turned to African diviners for protection against
witchcraft, cf. South African Commercial Advertiser 21 October 1843, pp. 163–4.
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of the Transvaal and they resorted to coercing it from the surrounding
African communities. This is one of the reasons that brought the Boers
into conflict with their African neighbors. Some voluntary labor of three-
or twelve-month contracts was available and paid for. However, the Boers
considered labor obtained in this manner both insufficient and lacking in
the requisite skills they needed.55
There was therefore another means by which the Boers obtained the
sort of African labor that would be both skilled and permanent. As soon
as they arrived in the Transvaal, Boer commandos periodically raided
weaker and less organized African communities and captured their little
children. In commando raids against communities such as the Bakgatla
of Chief Mosielele, Bakwena of Sechele, the Bapedi of Sekwati, Bak-
gatla of Mankopane, Balaka of Mokopane, and the Balobedu of Mod-
jadji, children were captured specifically in order to use them as “bonded
laborers.”56 Sometimes they were demanded as tribute, traded or secured
through exchange. Such captive children, referred to in the contempo-
rary Dutch parlance as inboekelinge (registerees) who were “booked in” and
notionally seen as “orphans,” were indentured to their masters.57 Rusten-
burg commandos, for example, raided African groups in the far northern
Transvaal. Indeed, Rustenburg has been described as “a slave trading center
with its own resident dealer.”58 Young captives were shared amongst the
Boer commandos, who brought them up on their farms.
The practice was common at the time throughout what was to become
the Transvaal. The cooperation of the Batswana who assisted in the com-
mando raids was no different from that of the amaSwazi, Bapedi, and
Vhavenda in this regard.59 The amaSwazi themselves participated in slave
raiding and traded in slaves. In the early stages of this practice, in the
1850s, Swazi regiments captured slaves during attacks on communities
within the Swazi kingdom and on its outskirts. Later, Swazi raids were
extended into the Lowveld and southern Mozambique. Bonner states, for
example, that “several hundred children a year” were captured mostly
55Delius, The Land, pp. 34–5.
56Morton, “Slave Raiding and Slavery in the Western Transvaal after the Sand River
Convention,” African Economic History, 20 (1992), pp. 102–3.
57Delius, The Land, p. 35.
58Cited in Morton, “Slave Raiding and Slavery,” p. 107; “Captive labor in the western
Transvaal after the Sand River Convention,” in Eldredge and Morton (Eds.), Slavery in
South Africa, p. 175.
59See Morton, “Slave Raiding and Slavery,” pp. 99–118; P. Delius and S. Trapido, “Inboeksel-
ings and Oorlams: The Creation and Transformation of a Servile Class,” Journal of Southern
African Studies, 8(2) (April 1982).
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from the Lowveld communities and traded with the Boers of the eastern
Transvaal.60 In November 1869, a Swazi army incursion into the Sout-
pansberg, for example, netted, among a variety of other booty, about “400
women and children.”61 The child captives obtained from these raids were
supplied to the eastern Transvaal Boers from whom, in return, “the Swazi
rulers received hunting dogs, cattle, blankets, and to a lesser extent, at the
beginning, guns and horses.”62 As servants on the Boer farms, they were
trained in a variety of skills, such as, stonecutting and building, brickmak-
ing, cookery, veterinary and folk medicine, literacy in Dutch, wagon repair,
hunting, gun maintenance, making cheese, and plow farming. But perhaps
the most important use of these servants is that, as Delius has said, “they
could be trusted with firearms and placed in supervisory positions over
herders and hunting and trading expeditions.” It was in this status that
these servants were known as inboekelinge. In using this kind of labor, the
Boers were in fact continuing an old tradition they had brought with them
from the Cape; there, indentured Khoekhoen and colored laborers were
used as “cooks, herders, and laborers, wagon drivers, and interpreters,” who
were also “fine shots and horsemen . . .” in their auxiliary role “as soldiers
on commando against the San and the amaXhosa.”63
The male inboekelinge were manumitted at the age of 21 and the females
at 25. But because of the lifelong separation from their geographical and
family origins, they generally remained working on labor contracts on
their ex-master’s farms or, as in the Rustenburg and Pilansberg areas, set-
tled as tenants on missionary-owned land or bought their own farms and
settled as peasant producers. It was in this status that they were known
as Oorlams.64 The children of inboekelinge were treated in the same man-
ner as their parents by their Boer masters. Where they settled and what
happened to them after manumission, however, differed from one area
to another. Delius has shown that in the northern Transvaal during the
1850s, for example, some would settle among the local African commu-
nities. Yet others were bonded once again on further contracts to their
masters.65
60Bonner, Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires, p. 92.
61J. C. A. Boeyens, “‘Black ivory’: The Indenture System and Slavery in Zoutpansberg,
1848–1869,” in Eldredge and Morton (Eds.), Slavery in South Africa, pp. 200–1. Quota-
tion, p. 201.
62Cited in P. Delius and S. Trapido, “Inboekselings and Oorlams,” pp. 228–9. Quotation,
p. 229.
63Quoted in Delius, The Land, p. 36.
64Mbenga, “The Bakgatla-baga-Kgafela,” pp. 56–8; Morton, Slavery in South Africa,
pp. 167–214
65P. Delius and S. Trapido, “Inboekselings and Oorlams,” pp. 235–6.
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In the Rustenburg and Pilansberg areas, after manumission, the Oorlams
tended to drift on to a farm called Welgeval, owned by the local Dutch
Reformed Church missionary, Henri Gonin, which they eventually bought
at the beginning of the twentieth century. Here, men like Cornelius Moloto,
Cornelius Sefara, and many others prospered as peasant farmers, cultivating
crops like wheat, rearing livestock, and making cheese for sale in the nearby
Rustenburg market. Most of the missionary work of spreading the gospel
and Western education was done by ex-inboekelinge teacher–evangelists.
Whereas the central mission stations in the region were staffed by a few
white missionaries, the African teacher–evangelists were entrusted with the
running of the many “outer stations” dotted all over the region. By the end of
the nineteenth century, for example, the DRC teacher–evangelist Stephanus
Moloto was in charge of the school on the farm Welgeval, and Zacharia
Tihira on Kruidfontein, Martha Moloto and Karl Thabole on Holfontein,
while Leoke Mariri ran a school in the border village of Malolwane. All
these were Oorlams upon whom Gonin heavily depended for his missionary
work.66 Among African communities in the western Transvaal, the Oorlams
acted as interpreters, skilled artisans, and hunters. Socially, it was common
practice for the Oorlams to marry within their own core community. This
could be explained by their shared bonds of historical background, Dutch
literacy, western education, and Christianity, factors which distinguished
them from the rest of the Africans around them.67 On the whole, by the
end of the nineteenth century, they had integrated well into the African
communities. However, the issues of Boer–African accommodation as well
as the roles and socioeconomic status of the Oorlams might belie the more
contentious question of land and land acquisition.
AFRICAN ACQUISITION OF LAND
On the premise that the Voortrekkers had defeated and expelled the
Ndebele from the Transvaal, land in the western Transvaal was now the
property of the ZAR government. Official policy therefore was that land
could only be “given” to Africans as a “grant” for “services rendered”
to them. In the western Transvaal, for example, the earliest known such
cases date back to the beginning of 1837 when the Commandants Andries
Potgieter, Gerrit Maritz, and Piet Uys gave land grants to some Tswana
66Mbenga, “The Bakgatla-baga-Kgafela,” pp. 66–8.
67F. Morton, “Manumitted slaves and the Dutch Reformed Church Mission in the Western
Transvaal and eastern Bechuanaland at the time of the colonization of southern Africa,
1864 to 1914,” paper to symposium, “Manumission: the promise of freedom,” Twelfth
International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Zagreb, Yugoslavia
( July 28, 1988), pp. 10–18.
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chiefs who had assisted the Boers in expelling Mzilikazi from the Transvaal.
Thus, the Rolong chiefs Moroka, Montshiwa, and Gontse, and the Hurutshe
chief, Moiloa, were “rewarded” with grants of land by Potgieter in the same
localities they had occupied before the Ndebele invasion. Chief Mokgatle
of the Bafokeng was similarly rewarded.68 Indeed, after the expulsion of
Mzilikazi, these groups were allowed back only with the permission of the
Boers.69 In fact, throughout the Transvaal, the Voortrekker commandants
gave land grants to black groups “for services rendered” or loyalty.70
Africans therefore could not acquire land they could legally call their
own as it was merely “loaned” to them. This was confirmed by Article 124
of a Volksraad Resolution 28 of November 1853, which stated that land was
given to Africans “conditionally as long as they behave in accordance with
the law and obediently.”71 According to another Volksraad Resolution 159
of June 18, 1855, Africans in the Transvaal were expressly forbidden to buy
land.72 Indeed, up to 1871, the issue of Africans buying land was never even
considered by the ZAR government. This complete lack of security of tenure
deeply concerned many Africans. In the western Transvaal, for example, the
people of Rustenburg district were perhaps the first to persistently request
the government for permission to buy land. In 1868, the Commandant
of Rustenburg echoed this concern that “certain Natives in his district
wished to purchase land from a burgher.” At first the authorities agreed in
principle to the idea of Africans buying land and suggested that its legal
ownership be held in trust by the government on behalf of the African
people concerned, “as long as they conducted themselves according to the
law.”73 Due to repeated African requests to buy land, especially from the
Rustenburg area, the government of President T. F. Burgers did consider
the issue in 1874, but then after further debates in the Volksraad, rejected
it because of Article 9 of the Grondwet, which stated that: “The [Boer]
people will not permit any equalisation of colored persons with white
inhabitants.”74
Arising from this frustration therefore, Africans resorted to the practice
of buying land through the white missionaries working among them.
68General Staff, War Office, The Native Tribes of the Transvaal, p. 20.
69For details, see the government Report by the Commissioner for Native Affairs, relative to
the Acquisition and Tenure of Land by Natives in the Transvaal (Pretoria: Native Affairs
Department, 1904), pp. 15–16.
70Acquisition and Tenure, pp. 18–20.
71Acquisition and Tenure, p. 20. The Volksraad was the parliament of the ZAR.
72T. R. H. Davenport and K. S. Hunt (Eds.), The Right to the Land (Cape Town: David
Philip, 1974), p. 4.
73Acquisition and Tenure, p. 21.
74For details, see Acquisition and Tenure, pp. 21–2.
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Each able-bodied adult male in a community contributed at least one cow
toward the purchase of a farm. However, those who could not afford were not
compelled to, nor were they denied a share of the land.75 The Africans would
give the purchase price through their chief to the missionary who would
buy the land from a white owner but register it in his name on behalf of that
community.76 This practice seems to have started quietly from as early as
the mid-1860s and lasted until the early 1880s. Since the practice lasted for
about a decade, the Boer authorities must have been aware of it but perhaps
turned a blind eye to it. But what seems clear is that the government
neither checked nor stopped it. Eventually, however, as it became more
and more prevalent, the government realized the need to regulate and
standardise the practice. Following the Pretoria Convention of 1881, a
Location Commission was formed in order to demarcate African locations,
take transfer of, and hold in trust, land previously privately bought through
missionaries by Africans. This responsibility was transferred to the secretary
for native affairs in the early 1880s, to the superintendent of natives in 1886,
the commissioner for native affairs (during the Crown colony government)
and, in 1907, to the minister of native affairs.77 Closely connected with the
issue of land was that of forced labor.
FORCED LABOR
The issue of forced labor, however, took a more general and coercive form
that in turn brought about widespread distress among the African com-
munities. The Boers considered the labor they obtained voluntarily from
Africans in the manner we have noted previously to be insufficient. Hence,
the resort to forced labor. Boer requirements for African labor were procured
through the local veldkornet, who has been described by Jeremy Krikler as
a “sinister landowning representative of the [white] farmers in each district
who hovered above the tenantry, violently intervening – when necessary – to
ensure the rendering of labor service.”78
The Boer practice of forced labor was pervasive throughout the Transvaal.
Following the founding of the town of Andries Ohrigstad in the northeast-
ern Transvaal in August 1845, for example, the Voortrekkers there came
to depend upon black “apprentices” and a “labor tax” forcibly extracted
75S. D. Matshego and B. N. O. Pilane, joint interview by Bernard Mbenga, Koedoesfontein,
the Pilanesberg, February 7, 1993.
76Acquisition and Tenure, p. 22.
77E. Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa (Pretoria: J. L. van Schaik, 1927),
pp. 126–7.
78J. Krikler, Revolution from Above, Rebellion from Below: the Agrarian Transvaal at the Turn
of the Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 135, 235–6. Our emphasis.
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from the surrounding African communities for agricultural and domestic
purposes.79 A contemporary writer had the following to say about Africans
in the Transvaal generally:
The Tribes . . . are forced to perform all the labour of the fields, such as manuring
the land, weeding, reaping, building, making dams and canals, and at the same
time to support themselves. I have myself been an eye-witness of Boers coming
to a village, and, according to their usual custom, demanding twenty or thirty
women to weed their gardens, and have seen the women proceed to the scene of
unrequited toil.80
The economic malaise of the ZAR during the 1860s exacerbated tensions
between the Boer authorities and the African communities.81 In this period,
as Roger Wagner has shown for the Soutpansberg area, previously profitable
sources of income for the Boers (such as hunting) were declining.82 With
diminishing resources, ZAR officials, such as Paul Kruger and Andries
Potgieter, resorted to ever harsher methods of extracting tax from the
Africans. As Stanley Trapido has stated: “Between 1850 and 1868, various
Volksraads attempted to raise taxes by exhortation, fines, proclamations,
and hectoring instructions to landdrosts, with little or no effect.”83 Accord-
ing to Trapido, the Boer need for more African labor at this time led
to territorial expansion through military expeditions westward, eastward,
and northward. However, although these expeditions were in themselves
disruptive,84 they do not seem to have procured enough labor from the
northern and eastern parts of the Transvaal where Africans had not yet come
under white hegemony. Therefore, until the 1880s and 1890s when such
expeditions yielded much larger numbers of captive Africans,85 the Boer
authorities got their labor requirements from conquered African groups
that were already under their jurisdiction, such as the various Tswana
groups in the western Transvaal.
Both Trapido and Delius have shown how holders of high office in the
ZAR were well placed to take advantage of not only accumulating personal
79Cited in Mbenga, “Forced labour,” p. 134.
80W. E. Garrett Fisher, The Transvaal and the Boers, A Brief History (reprinted: New York:
Negro University Press, 1969), p. 275.
81S. Trapido, “Reflections on land, office and wealth in the South African Republic, 1850–
1900,” in Marks and Atmore (Eds.), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa,
p. 356.
82For details, see R. Wagner, “Zoutpansberg,” pp. 323–37.
83Trapido, “Land, office and wealth,” p. 356.
84Trapido, “Aspects in the transition from slavery to serfdom,” p. 26.
85For details of these later Boer military campaigns, see especially T. J. Makhura, “The
Bagananwa polity in the north-western Transvaal and the South African Republic,
c. 1836–1896,” M.A. dissertation, University of Bophuthatswana (1993).
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wealth but, more importantly for the African communities, extracting
the ever elusive labor.86 In the Pilansberg during the 1860s, for example,
because of their need for labor, Boer leaders accelerated their efforts to obtain
more of it.87 It was during this period that Paul Kruger, then commandant
in the Rustenburg District, began to build a dam for a wheat irrigation
project in Saulspoort. Kgatla men were inspanned to wagons and carts
containing stone boulders and forced to pull them to the dam-construction
site. One afternoon in April 1870, after the Bakgatla had refused to continue
to work, their chief, Kgamanyane, was tied to a wagon and, in front of a
large gathering, Paul Kruger himself publicly flogged the chief. Angered
and humiliated by this incident, Kgamanyane and about half of his people
emigrated to Mochudi in Kwena country in what was later to become
Botswana, where their descendants have lived to this day.88 But there were
in fact precedents of other African chiefs in the Transvaal who were in
similar conflict with Boer leaders. Breutz, for example has recorded that
as early as the 1840s, “owing to trouble with the Boers,” presumably over
labor demands, the Tlhokwa chief, Matlapeng, and his people fled their
home in the Matlapengsberg area of the Pilansberg “and sought refuge with
the Kwena chief Sechele”89 in today’s Botswana. In about 1860, still in the
Pilansberg, Chief Mabe of the Batlhako “got into trouble with the Boers
who gave him a flogging. He then left with his tribe for Molepolole [i.e., in
modern Botswana] and settled at Magagarape.”90 For the Marico (Madikwe)
District, Andrew Manson has recorded that the Boers’ “persistent demands
for labour . . . eventually forced [Chief] Mangope to lead the rest of his
community out of the Transvaal in 1858.”91
African chiefs were in fact routinely punished by the Boer authorities if
they were held to have transgressed the law or flouted authority. In 1851,
Mahura, the chief of the Batlhaping, was summoned before the Volksraad
86See Trapido, “Aspects in the transition”; Delius, The Land, Chapter 6; “Abel Erasmus:
power and profit in the eastern Transvaal,” in W. Beinart et al. (Eds.), Putting a Plough to
the Ground ( Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), p. 181.
87National Archives of South Africa (NASA), Pretoria, CAD, GOV/756/Ps 50, “Purchase
of land by Natives after the Retrocession, 1884 to 1899,” p. 83.
88B. Mbenga, “Forced labour in the Pilanesberg: The flogging of Chief Kgamanyane by
Commandant Paul Kruger, Saulspoort, April 1870,” Journal of Southern African Studies,
23(1) (March 1997), pp. 127–40.
89See Breutz, The Tribes of the Rustenburg and Pilanesberg Districts (Pretoria: Native Affairs
Department, 1953), pp. 365, 380. The quotations are from the two pages, respectively.
90Breutz, The Tribes, p. 291. Our emphasis. Breutz does not state why Mabe was flogged,
but it was presumably due to his inability to supply the required numbers of laborers.
For details of two other Tswana groups who fled from the Pilansberg because of “trouble
with the Boers,” see Breutz, The Tribes, pp. 431, 439.
91Manson, “The Hurutshe,” p. 92.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521517942.008
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 14 Dec 2017 at 11:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core
From Colonial Hegemonies to Imperial Conquest, 1840–1880 355
and forced to pay a fine of 2,070 head of cattle for allegedly attacking
one of his Tswana neighbors and “shedding blood on lands belonging to
the Republic.”92 During one of the Boer expeditions of conquest against
black groups in the western Transvaal in the early 1850s, Commandant
P. Scholtz, then based at the Klein Marico Camp in the Zeerust area,
commanded Montshiwa, the chief of the Barolong “to send immediately
two hundred armed men on horseback . . . with victuals for a fortnight
to assist us in punishing Sechele.”93 When Montshiwa defied that order,
Scholtz summoned him “before the Council of War to appear within five
days to answer for your disobedience to my orders.”94 Sensing danger,
Montshiwa and some of his followers abandoned their home, Lotlhakane,
on September 15, 1852, and fled to Setlhagole, about 70 km to the west
of present-day Mafikeng. A Boer commando pursued them but Montshiwa
managed to escape and eventually fled to the relative safety of Ngwaketse
country in what was to become the British Protectorate of Bechwanaland
where he lived in exile from 1856 to 1870.95
MISSIONARIES, THE ZAR AUTHORITIES, AND AFRICANS
The foregoing kinds of relations between the Boer authorities and African
chiefs became more conflictual over the matter of “bonded labor” about
which we have already noted. “Bonded labor” was reportedly widely abused
by the Boers and condemned as slavery by British missionaries and officials.
African allies were also expected to return runaway captives. In 1848, for
example, David Livingstone, of the London Missionary Society, reported
meeting four Laka children at a Boer’s farm in Rustenburg. Livingstone
encouraged them to escape but “they said they had often run away but
Mokhatla (sic) [chief of Bafokeng] caught them and returned them to their
owners.”96 The missionary condemnation of the Boer practice of “bonded
labor” originated from the 1850s when Livingstone, then working among
the Bakwena of Chief Sechele, was accused by the Boers of influencing
92J. A. I. Agar-Hamilton, The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers: An Essay in the History of the
Interior of South Africa (Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1928), p. 78.
93Quoted in S. M. Molema, Chief Moroka, His Life and Times (Cape Town: Methodist
Church, 1951), p. 91. Regarding details of the conflict between Chief Sechele and the
Boers, see Ramsay, “The Rise and Fall of the Bakwena Dynasty,” pp. 89–116.
94Molema, Chief Moroka, p. 92. See also T. V. Bulpin, Lost Trails of the Transvaal (Cape
Town: Howard Timmins, 1965), pp. 83–4.
95P. L. Breutz, The Tribes of Mafeking District (Pretoria: Native Affairs Departartment,
1956), pp. 190–1.
96Cited in Morton, “Slave Raiding,” from I. Schapera (Ed.), David Livingstone’s Family
Letters, 1841–1856, vol. I (1956) (London: Chatto and Windus, 1959), p. 236.
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the Bakwena against them.97 This resulted in the Boer dislike and dis-
trust of missionaries, especially if they were of British origin, as they were
suspected of inciting African communities against the Boer authorities.
From then on, African chiefs under Boer authority were not allowed to
accept missionaries, especially English-speaking ones, to work among their
people without the permission of the Volksraad.98 That was why in the
Rustenburg area, the ZAR authorities invited, instead, German-speaking
Hermannsburg missionaries, instead, to work among the Bakwena, because
they felt that they were “not so dangerous to them in their foreign policy
as the English missionaries.”99 The Rev. S. Hofmeyr, a Dutch Reformed
Church missionary who worked among Africans in the Soutpansberg area
during the early days of white settlement there, for example, was “practi-
cally boycotted” by the Boers in the area, “on account of his vocation,”100 of
doing missionary work among Africans.
From the late 1850s, when missionaries were seeking to work among
African communities in the Transvaal, even if the Boer authorities had
permitted them to do so, the next hurdle was getting the approval of
the chief and his lekgotla. At first, the African groups simply had fear
of the unknown. However, once the chief had agreed, missionary work
proceeded fairly quickly. But sometimes a chief would expressly seek the
services of a missionary. This often happened for security reasons. Chief
Kgamanyane of the Bakgatla in the Pilansberg, for example, invited the
Rev. Henri Gonin to his capital in 1865 because of conflict he had been
experiencing with the Boer farmers around him for at least two decades. For
the northern Transvaal, Isabel Hofmeyr has suggested that Chief Makopane
of the amaNdebele invited the Berlin Mission Society missionaries to settle
at his capital partly “for political and diplomatic ends, particularly because
he had, for some time, been embroiled in a low level war with the Boers.
Indeed, it was often as messenger and emissary that Makopane used the
first missionary, W. Moschutz.”101 After having been permitted by the
Boer authorities, the BMS missionaries first entered the ZAR in 1860
97Boer-missionary conflict is quite detailed in F. J. Ramsey, “The Rise and Fall of the
Bakwena Dynasty of South-Central Botswana, 1820–1940,” Ph.D. thesis, Boston Uni-
versity (1991), pp. 82–116. See also S. Glassman, “Livingstone confronts the Boer
Commandants,” Midwest Quarterly, 23(3) (1982), pp. 251–67.
98Eybers, Select Constitutional Documents, p. 414; Agar-Hamilton, Native Policy, p. 132.
99J. E. Carlyle, South Africa and its Mission Fields (London: Nisbet, 1878), p. 245.
100Agar-Hamilton, The Native Policy, p. 117.
101 I. Hofmeyr, “Jonah and the swallowing monster: orality and literacy on a Berlin Mission
Station in the Transvaal,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 17(4) (December, 1991),
p. 636.
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and established mission stations among the Bapedi and Vhavenda in the
Steelpoort and Soutpansberg areas. The BMS, the largest of the Lutheran
societies operating in Southern Africa, had its most important station
at Botshabelo, founded by Alexander Merensky, among the Bapedi with
the permission of King Sekwati. As “the representative of the Z.A.R.
among the Pedi,” Merensky played a partisan role in support of the Boer
authorities vis-a`-vis the Bapedi on every issue, particularly in view of the
fact that the Pedi polity was still independent and had not yet come under
Boer rule. In the mid-1870s, French-speaking Swiss missionaries settled
in the Spelonken foothills of the Soutpansberg where they worked among
immigrants from the east whom they would later qualify as “Tsonga.” As
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, the first Christian converts were initially
harassed and shunned by chiefs until much later when the numbers of
converts increased.102
Up to the 1880s, the missionary field in the Transvaal was dominated
by four Christian denominations: the Dutch Reformed Church and the
Hermmansburg Mission Society in the west and the Berlin Mission Soci-
ety and Swiss Mission in the north. The first Christian missionaries to
the Batswana were involved in spreading the Gospel and the rudiments
of western education. In doing this they did not only impart their Chris-
tian beliefs but also their cultural, political, and commercial values. They
introduced the use of agricultural aids such as, for example, plowing with
oxen, irrigation, and wagons, while their wives taught domestic skills such
as knitting, sewing, baking, nursing, and midwifery. They also produced
religious and language texts in African languages, following the translation
tradition first established by Robert Moffat at Kuruman in the 1820s. Each
missionary society published materials for the people among whom they
worked, the Dutch Reformed Church in Sekgatla, the Berlin Mission Soci-
ety in Sepedi, and the Hermannsburg Mission Society in Sekwena. It was
the disposition of an African chief that determined the success or failure of
Christian missionary work. As Roger Beck has stated:
The rulers invited the missionaries in and determined where they could settle, what
activities they could perform, what benefits they must provide, what members of
society they could influence, and when they must leave. Missionary fortunes shifted
with the political, social, and economic forces at work among the Sotho and Tswana,
forces over which the missionaries had little control.103
102Delius, The Land, pp. 117–21.
103R. B. Beck, “Monarchs and Missionaries among the Tswana and Sotho,” in R. Elphick
and R. Davernport (Eds.), Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social and Cultural
History (Cape Town: David Philip, 1997), pp. 116–20. Quotation, pp. 119–20.
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CONQUEST AND EARLY COLONIAL RULE IN NATAL
In the southeastern lowlands, disappointments befell Boer Trekkers who
attempted to seize territory from the Zulu kingdom south of the Thukela
River. Although they had killed 3,000 of King Dingane’s soldiers in a
battle at Ncome River (or Blood River) in December 1838, they were
unable to compel his submission until the king’s younger brother, Mpande,
defected with 17,000 followers. It was Mpande’s regiments rather than Boer
commandos that brought about the final defeat of Dingane in January 1840.
This left Mpande with a diminished Zulu kingdom north of the Thukela
and a Boer “Republic of Natalia” south of the river. Even that state proved
to be a flash in a pan. Officials at the Cape and humanitarian societies
in Britain were so alarmed by the prospect that Boers might provoke a
general flight toward their eastern frontier that an armed expeditionary
force was despatched in 1842 to effect the annexation of Natal. After a
spirited defense, the republicans relinquished their claims to sovereignty.
And even though the British guaranteed land titles issued by Natalia, a large
portion of the defeated Trekker families had grown fond of independence
and preferred to join their compatriots on the Highveld.
One person’s setback was usually another’s opportunity. Just as the depar-
ture of Mzilikazi opened the way for chiefs and people to reclaim land in
the northwest, the Zulu and Boer defeats in Natal left large tracts open to
occupation by small- and middle-sized chieftaincies. Some of these groups
were local people who had emerged from hiding, some were returning
from exile to the lands of their ancestors and others were adventurers on the
make. Zikhali ka Matiwane typified the movement. His father, Matiwane,
had led a large body of his Ngwane followers away from the Zulu kingdom
in the 1820s, first to glory in the Caledon Valley and then to catastrophic
defeat by British and Xhosa forces at the battle of Mbholompo on the
Umtata River in 1828. When Matiwane returned ignominiously to Zulu-
land and was executed by Dingane, Zikhali sought refuge with Sobhuza in
the nascent Swazi kingdom. Sensing an opportunity to rebuild the family
fortunes when Mpande left the Zulu kingdom, Zikhali offered his services
to the Boer–Zulu coalition that marched against Dingane in 1840. The
Boer government of Natal showed no gratitude for Zikhali’s contribution
and actually threw him into jail for alleged misappropriation of captured
cattle. With the Boers deposed, Zikhali established his headquarters on
the slopes of the Drakensberg and sent messengers to the widely dispersed
Ngwane, inviting them to live under his leadership. His experience was
repeated by adventurous chiefs, so that within a few years the numbers
of Africans settled in Natal grew from a few thousands to an estimated
100,000. This population movement dwarfed the great Boer Trek and
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created dilemmas for the newly established British authority, which did
not get around to appointing a diplomatic agent to deal with the chiefs
until 1845. Theophilus Shepstone, who filled that position (retitled secre-
tary for native affairs in 1856), emerged as one of the most creative imperial
administrators of his age. The system of government that evolved under
his leadership was widely imitated as British colonization spread north to
Kenya and laid the groundwork for the twentieth-century policy known as
indirect rule.
Military, financial, and cultural considerations governed the develop-
ment of Shepstone’s system.104 As an isiXhosa-speaking teenage son of a
Methodist missionary, he had served as an interpreter on the staff of Major-
General D’Urban during the war of 1834–35. Shepstone learned on the
battlefield to respect the military capacities of his African adversaries. After
the war he saw his own chief, D’Urban, dismissed for mishandling diplo-
macy, spending too much of taxpayers’ money and pandering to the racial
prejudices of settlers. Postwar employment as British resident agent among
Xhosa groups on the eastern Cape frontier taught Shepstone something of
the cultural forms and institutions of chieftaincy.105 He put all these lessons
into practice in Natal. The small British garrisons at Pietermaritzburg and
D’Urban could not be expected to cope with an African uprising, even if
they were reinforced by militia recruited from the tiny population of white
settlers. Consequently, the first principle of Shepstone’s military policy was
to avoid actions that might provoke an uprising of chiefs or an invasion
from the Zulu kingdom. That in turn required the provision of adequate
land for the Natal chiefs – a task undertaken by a land commission in 1845.
As European settlers were still thin on the ground, the commission had
considerable scope for marking out large reserves even after endorsing the
land titles granted by the Trekker government in a broad swath of territory
from Ladysmith to Pietermaritzburg. Whereas settlers preferred farms on
relatively flat land easily accessible by road, chiefs were accustomed to look
for positions where cattle might be well defended. They did not mind “bro-
ken country” provided there was adequate rainfall and good pasturage. An
additional factor bearing on the land commission’s deliberations was mis-
sionary influence. Not only did his own background predispose Shepstone
to favor missions, one of his fellow land commissioners was an Ameri-
can missionary. As originally envisaged, each reserve would have both a
104N. Etherington, “The ‘Shepstone System’ in the Colony of Natal and beyond the Borders,”
in A. Duminy and B. Guest (Eds.), Natal and Zululand, a New History (Pietermaritzburg:
University of Natal Press, 1989), pp. 170–92.
105T. McClendon, “The Man Who Would Be Inkosi: Civilising Missions in Shepstone’s
Early Career,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 30 (2004), p. 346.
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resident magistrate dispensing justice and resident missionaries, promot-
ing “Christianity and civilization.” Naturally, missionaries favored large
reserves, hoping that their missions would gain a captive audience. The
American missionaries were particularly favored by the provision of large
reserves around their stations along the coast of Natal. The land commis-
sion could not have foreseen in 1846 that European growers of cane sugar
would soon be demanding land in the coastal regions. On a map the distri-
bution of “Native Reserves” suggests a grand design of social engineering –
a wholesale relocation of chiefs and people to lands not required by set-
tler farms. However, few if any people were moved in the first instance;
the commission confirmed most chiefs in possession of land they already
occupied. Moreover, large numbers of people continued to live outside the
reserves on land theoretically held by settlers. A speculative commercial
enterprise, the Natal Land and Colonization Company, took up large tracts
of land earmarked for future settlement. While awaiting a boom in land
values that would reap large profits, the company enjoyed a steady income
by collecting rent from African “tenants.”106 Because tenants were exempt
from the hut taxes, the rents were tolerable. So long as these tracts and
the reserves provided adequate space for people and their cattle, Shepstone
could feel reasonably confident that there would be no concerted rebellion
against British rule.
Another imperative of Shepstone’s system was financial: His administra-
tive apparatus must pay for itself. In the early years he hoped for government
grants large enough to pay for the direct government of the whole African
population. When no such grants eventuated, Shepstone scaled down his
plans. His principal source of revenue was the taxes paid annually by chiefs
in cash on the basis of the number of huts inhabited by their followers.
Also important were contributions made in kind through the forced labor
demanded for roads and other public works. Reasoning that under the
precolonial regime chiefs could command military and other services from
young men, Shepstone insisted on his right to do the same. This not only
gave him a labor force to build roads but a military force that could be
mobilized to crush any threat of resistance. This aspect of the administra-
tion relied heavily on hand-picked men like Ngoza, who had no hereditary
claims to chiefly status, but who was raised to an exalted position for his
services to Shepstone and the government of Natal.107
The cultural aspects of Shepstone’s system owed more to circumstances
than to deliberate planning. In the early years, the government let chiefs
106H. Slater, “Land, Labour and Capital in Natal: The Natal Land and Colonisation Company
1860–1948,” Journal of African History, 16 (1975), pp. 257–84.
107N. Etherington, Preachers, Peasants and Politics in Southeast Africa (London: Royal Histor-
ical Society, 1978), p. 61.
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rule their people pretty much as they wished, provided they paid their hut
taxes and made no trouble. Given his limited resources, Shepstone could
hardly do otherwise. However, in 1847 a difficult criminal case exposed
the difficulties inherent in allowing two legal systems to flourish side by
side.108 Several men were brought to trial for killing an alleged witch.
A senior Natal judge, Henry Cloete, insisted that this was a clear case
of murder. Shepstone, in contrast, recommended clemency, arguing that
customary practice had long sanctioned the execution of people convicted
of witchcraft. Whereas British justice in the nineteenth century could
not endorse witch trials, this case should not be treated as an ordinary
homicide. Faced with the impossibility of reconciling the two positions,
the colonial governor appealed to Britain’s secretary of state for the colonies,
Earl Grey, for a ruling. Although dual legal systems existed in Quebec, the
Cape Colony, and certain parts of the British India Company’s dominion,
never before had the British Empire officially recognized the unwritten
customary practices of indigenous people. Grey’s masterly decision decreed
that practices contrary to the principles of humanity must be suppressed,
but that other customs could continue during the slow evolution toward
“British civilization.”109 Thus, the killing of accused witches in Natal must
cease, but other practices, such as polygamy and lobola could continue.
Following Grey’s decision, Shepstone set about gradually codifying the
body of custom he called Native Law. This was not just law as understood by
established chiefs. Natal’s governor was formally constituted the supreme
chief of all the African people. All magistrates on Native Reserves held
concurrent commissions as administrators of Native Law and met with
Shepstone from time to time to promote uniformity in the code. Discussions
usually centered on matters of family law and inheritance, which differed
dramatically from British practice.
A conspicuous feature of the new regime was that neither Shepstone
nor his magistrates dealt with women. The oral annals of precolonial soci-
eties provide many examples of prestigious women wielding chiefly power.
MaNthatisi, mother of Sekonyela, of the Batlokwa was only one of many
well-known women who exercised such influence. On one occasion the
impassioned speech of a matriarch in the councils of the amaHlubi stopped
a threatened war with the amaNgwane.110 However, women had no place in
108For an extensive discussion of parallel colonial legal systems, see M. Chanock,Law, Custom
and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985).
109Earl Grey to H. Smith, December 10, 1847, based on James Stephen’s Minute of
September 17, 1847, CO 179/2, National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, UK.
110N. J. van Warmelo (Ed.), History of Matiwane and the Amangwane Tribe, as told by
Msebenzi to his kinsman Albert Hlongwane (Pretoria: Native Affairs Depatment, 1938),
pp. 124–6.
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Shepstone’s system. Thus, the laws he made to regulate family life reflected
male opinions. It is for this reason that Jeff Guy has termed Shepstone’s
arrangements an “accommodation of patriarchs.”111 This should not be read
as an accommodation of two equally patriarchal societies; it represented a
European patriarchal conception of African social systems acquired through
dealings with male chiefs.
As numbers of European settlers increased, Natal’s government con-
fronted a cultural problem of a different order. New settlers brought with
them ideas about social class and color that predisposed them to view
themselves as a master class born to rule the African majority, whom they
termed “savages.” Although the settler population was small before 1880 –
mostly settled in Durban, Pietermaritzburg, and a few other small towns –
their influence was out of all proportion to their numbers. They founded
newspapers, formed town councils, held meetings, established armed mili-
tia, and, after a large measure of self-government was granted to Natal by
the British parliament in 1856, elected a majority of the membership of
the colony’s Legislative Assembly. Very few accepted the dictum of Natal’s
constitution that the law would permit no distinction of color, religion, or
social origin. On the contrary, they insisted on unequal treatment before
the law. A Select Commission on Native Affairs in 1852 foreshadowed what
might be expected from a settler-dominated government.
In the absence of any representative body to express African opinion,
it fell to Shepstone as secretary for native affairs to speak for the majority
of the population in the Legislative Assembly. The most frequent bone
of contention was the settler demand that government do more to drive
African men and women into wage labor as servants and manual workers.
Their favored solutions to their labor problem were that the Native Reserves
should be reduced in size, that taxes on huts and other aspects of African
life be increased, and that the customs of lobola and polygamy be abolished
so that African men could no longer live off the labor of their women
folk. Shepstone answered these demands with the argument that wholesale
interference with African land tenure and customs would provoke an armed
rising that the colony was ill-equipped to quell. On questions of African
law and custom, he worked to shore up the boundaries between the settlers’
British legal system and his department’s administrative structure of chiefly
rule and Native Law. In the longer run, he hoped that British rule might
be extended to neighboring territories which could provide a “safety valve”
for Natal’s growing African population.
111“An Accommodation of Patriarchs: Theophilus Shepstone and the Foundations of the
System of Native Administration in Natal.” Paper presented at Conference on Masculin-
ities in Southern Africa, University of Natal, Durban ( July 1997).
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If the experience of Zikhali is any guide, most of Natal’s chiefs appre-
ciated Shepstone’s administrative system until well into the late 1860s.
The hut tax seemed a small price to pay for security from the threat of
Zulu power across the Thukela and raiding parties from other Natal chiefs.
He prospered in the midst of his reconstituted Ngwane chieftaincy. A
German missionary who settled near his headquarters gave advice on how
to deal with colonial authorities and dispensed lessons in reading, writ-
ing, and arithmetic. Zikhali’s wealth and prestige caused even people from
Zululand to join him saying, “it were far better for us to become subjects
of the son of Matiwane.”112 The increase of his herds eventually won him a
Swazi princess as his great wife. Not far away, the son of one of his father’s
determined enemies, Langalibalele ka Mthimkulu, also watched with satis-
faction as his cattle and people multiplied on the slopes of the Drakensberg.
After a falling out with Mpande, Langalibalele had led a large following out
of Zululand. Shepstone welcomed them on the condition that they wage
war on the “Bushmen raiders” who came down from the mountains to steal
cattle from white farmers.113 Natal’s recognition of a form of customary law
comforted people who had supposed the unsettling presence of Europeans
would threaten the foundations of their existence. In particular, fathers who
had feared a loss of control of their wives and daughters appreciated Shep-
stone’s apparent understanding of their situation. Thus, a Victorian British
social system that had yet to accord equal rights to women extended a help-
ing hand to African men who worried that their control over the means
of production and reproduction might be threatened by the new impe-
rial order in Natal. Many chiefs welcomed the new order. A photograph
taken in 1862, shortly before his death, shows Zikhali resplendent in a
European military uniform surrounded by his most important subordinate
chiefs.
Thus, the construction of the “Shepstone system” owed as much to Natal
chiefs as colonial authority. It was an administrative and legal framework
rather than a social order. Even its progenitors acknowledged that social and
economic change must come. Shepstone frequently expressed the unrealis-
tic hope that the whole population of Natal would move in the direction of
enlightened progress. Whereas rapid changes occurred in very small sectors
of society, they clearly indicated the course of future development. Settler
demands for cheap labor required constant movement in and out of the
designated reserves. To partially control those movements, colonial author-
ities resorted to an old Cape institution: the pass. Workers in villages and
112Van Warmelo, History of Matiwane, p. 126.
113J. Wright, Bushman Raiders of the Drakensberg, 1840–1870 (Pietermaritzburg: University
of Natal Press, 1971).
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towns had to conform as well to dress codes, regulation of daily wages, and
an unfamiliar criminal code. They learned new fashions, drank seriously
alcoholic beverages, and caught new diseases. The few women who escaped
control by husbands and fathers by moving to towns found themselves in
demand as prostitutes; through sexual contact with settlers they acquired
venereal diseases that gradually spread fear and loathing through the coun-
tryside. People who adopted the new faiths taught by foreign missionaries
experienced even more startling change. As at the Cape, almost all mis-
sionaries insisted that Christianity came as part of a total cultural package.
Conversion must be accompanied by outward and visible signs of inner
change: European styles of dress; a new kind of family life based on radical
changes in ideas about masculinity and femininity; novel notions of health
and hygiene; and adaptation to an economy based on wage labor, and an
aspiration to accumulate capital. The most challenging elements of the mis-
sionary cultural package were rules about marriage and kinship. Marriage
was defined as the union of one man with one woman. Presentation of cattle
to the father of one’s bride was strongly discouraged, as was the widespread
practicing of taking on the wife of one’s dead brother. Resistance to the
Christian cultural package was so widespread in the early days that mis-
sionaries gained very few followers. Those who did come to mission stations
tended to be very young, very poor, or on the run. However, with the pas-
sage of time some converts to Christianity began to grow wealthy through
growing cash crops, trade, and transport. Although Christians were not the
only ones to prosper, their aspirations differed from people who clung to a
more traditional lifestyle. Missionaries actively exhorted converts to be like
them in all ways, including participation in the rights enjoyed by all the
subjects of the British queen. By the early 1860s, converts to Christianity,
known as the kholwa (believers), had begun to petition the government,
demanding equality before the law.114
Shepstone’s answer was to ask, equal before what law? Aside from mis-
sionaries, government officials, and a few brave individuals like David
Dale Buchanan, editor of the Natal Witness newspaper, Europeans stub-
bornly resisted the extension of the vote beyond their own little circle.
Torn between the settler’s racial exclusivity and the constitution’s insis-
tence that there should be no legal distinctions based on color, Shepstone
found a solution based on Earl Grey’s recognition of Native Law. Legislation
in 1865 decreed that no people subject to Native Law could vote unless
they successfully applied for exemption on the basis of their property hold-
ings, education, and commitment to conform to all British laws, including
114Natal Witness, 27 March 1863; Etherington, Preachers, Peasants and Politics, Chapter 5,
pp. 87–114.
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those on marriage.115 The principle of this legislation outweighed any
practical benefits because only a few dozen individuals ever succeeded in
winning exemption from Native Law. Henceforth, Europeans inhabited a
separate privileged world legally removed from the majority of the popula-
tion. They used their privileges to ruthlessly minimize taxes on themselves
while maximizing those paid by Africans. Though Britain’s imperial gov-
ernment forbade them to occupy the Native Reserves, the settlers used
every other means available to force labor into their service. These means
included raising taxes and tariffs on imported goods primarily consumed
by Africans, as well as government help in securing contract labor from
neighboring territories and overseas. This brought Natal to a significant
turning point in 1860 when the colony used taxes raised from Africans
to finance the importation of laborers from Mozambique and indentured
workers from British India. Unable to force local people into long-term
contracts on their sugar estates, planters saw the imported workers as a
stable, tractable labor force that would be available year round. The ini-
tial experiment with Indian indentured labor foundered during a recession
and for a time Natal sought to build a stable labor supply for the planta-
tions on the basis of migrants drawn from Mozambique. In 1874, Indian
immigration resumed and, a decade later, as war in the Zulu kingdom
and the lure of high wages at Kimberley made the importation of Mozam-
bicans unprofitable, the plantations came to depend on these indentured
workers.116 For the next four decades, Indian men and women continued to
come to Natal on the understanding that their rights would be looked after
by Britain’s India Office – a hope that was only partially fulfilled. Their
presence complicated the question of social status in South Africa. From
the settler point of view, they were another subordinated group to rule, as
were the “shiftless amatongas.” From Shepstone’s point of view, the Indians’
status was ambiguous; certainly they could not be brought under Native
Law. So long as they were engaged in work contracts, their movements
could be controlled by the colony’s so-called Protector of Immigrants using
the stringent provisions of the Masters and Servants Act. However, they
had rights to legal representation and the free practice of their religion
(there were Hindus, Muslims, and Christians among them). Many workers
chose to return to India at the expiration of their contracts, but others exer-
cised the right to stay on. Gradually, the independent Indian community
expanded, a largely literate and commercially sophisticated society bent on
exercising the full rights of citizenship.
115B. Guest and A. Duminy, Natal and Zululand, A New History, p. 147.
116P. Richardson, “The Natal Sugar Industry in the Nineteenth Century,” in W. Beinart
et al. (Eds.), Putting a Plough to the Ground, pp. 134–5.
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From the beginning, the British colony of Natal was entangled in the
affairs of all Southeastern Africa. Bonds of language, culture, kinship,
and inheritance bound its people to neighbors on all sides. The complex
laws governing ownership of cattle in particular caused Shepstone and his
corps of resident magistrates to be constantly in contact with people from
faraway places who came to claim the cattle they believed were owed them
through lobola arrangements made years – sometimes decades – earlier.
Because some important chiefs and their followers had moved from the
Zulu kingdom to new residences as far afield as Mozambique, Malawi,
and Zimbabwe, Shepstone had access to a network of information about
southern Africa unprecedented in the annals of British administration.
Communication, of course, worked both ways. Distant chiefs and kings
knew a great deal about the affairs of Natal. They watched with interest
as the results of this experiment in cooperation between semiautonomous
chiefs and British colonialism unfolded. A great deal of attention focused
on the comparative fortunes of the mixed government of Natal and the
independent Zulu kingdom across the Thukela River.
Relations between the two regional powers were never entirely com-
fortable. Shepstone maintained a number of border agents whose job was
to watch for signs of Zulu aggression. Mpande, likewise, constantly sent
messengers and spies to Natal during his long reign (1840–72). The king
seemed always to be in two minds about the wisdom of developing his
state along western lines – an issue that in the early years centered on
the missionary question. His predecessor, Dingane, had mixed experiences
with missionaries. Allen Gardiner had proved an invaluable intermediary
in dealing with the turbulent traders of Port Natal and the British Empire.
Francis Owen, on the other hand, had proved worse than useless in the crisis
sparked by the arrival of the Voortrekkers. After assuming power, Mpande
allowed an American missionary, Aldin Grout, to establish a station in the
southwest corner of the kingdom. When runaways, dissidents, and accused
criminals gathered round the missionary, claiming independence of the
king’s authority, he closed the station down and would not admit other
missionaries until 1851. When an intrepid Norwegian, Hans Schreuder,
gained a foothold through an offer of secular medical and technological
services, he shrewdly avoided challenging royal authority, accepting the
king’s policy of treating Christian converts as noncitizens while serving as
Mpande’s amanuensis in written communications with Natal. There the
missionary influence might have ended but for a crisis that exposed the
fragility of the Zulu constitution. Unlike his elder brothers, Shaka and
Dingane, Mpande married many wives and acknowledged large numbers
of children. As his eldest children grew to manhood, they began to jockey
for the position of heir-apparent. Tensions between Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi
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came to a head in 1856. A dance competition provided the pretense for
all-out war between their opposing factions that resulted in the death of
Mbuyazi and the triumph of Cetshwayo’s Usutu party.117 Mpande grasped
the danger that he might become the pawn – or perhaps the next victim –
of his overbearing son and moved to counter Cetshwayo’s influence through
diplomacy. Suddenly the door was open to missionaries, although the pol-
icy of treating converts to Christianity as aliens remained in place. Unable
to meet the demand with Norwegians, Hans Schreuder in 1858 invited
fellow Lutherans attached to the Hermannsburg Missionary Society to take
advantage of the new policy. These missionaries were active in trade and
readily provided technical aid, as when the Hermannsburgers built wagons
and carriages for the king. Cetshwayo’s rivalry with his half-brothers did
not end with the death of Mbuyazi. In the wake of the civil war some of
Mpande’s wives and sons had fled to Natal, where they posed an obvious
future danger. One in particular, Mkungu, had settled with his mother
on the mission station of Anglican Bishop John William Colenso, who
had formed a close friendship with Shepstone.118 Colenso spoke openly of
Mkungu as a young prince who would be the future king of the Zulu. Fear
that Zulu forces were about to invade Natal in 1861 (with the rumored
intention of killing Mkungu) provided an opportunity for Shepstone and
Colenso to visit Zululand in order to reach an understanding with Mpande
and Cetshwayo. They reached an agreement that left Mpande in secure
possession of the throne while officially acknowledging that Natal recog-
nized Cetshwayo as his heir. Mpande also agreed that the door would be
open to missionaries of all societies to establish stations in his kingdom.
For a time, Colenso and Shepstone even toyed with the idea of going to the
Zulu kingdom as spiritual and secular advisors, with the ultimate aim of
bringing the kingdom under British protection. This demonstrated how
far Shepstone’s confidence in his system had advanced; it had become, in
his own mind at least, a template for benevolent British rule of any region
of Southeastern Africa.
DIPLOMACY AND CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ORANGE
AND VAAL RIVERS
Whereas Natal remained far from a perfect illustration of the kind of future
powerful chiefs desired, it certainly contrasted favorably with the war and
117C. de B. Webb and J. B. Wright (Eds.), A Zulu King Speaks: Statements made by Cetshwayo
KaMpande on the History and Customs of His People (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal
Press, 1978), pp. 15–16.
118J. Guy, The Heretic: A Study of the Life of John William Colenso, 1814–1883 ( Johannesburg:
Ravan Press, 1983), p. 222.
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conquest inflicted on Xhosa chiefs over the last few decades. Shepstone
was a man with whom chiefs could do business. Whereas earlier colonial
officials had responded with derision to offers of marriage with any chief’s
daughter, Shepstone knew what to do when Mswati of Swaziland made
such a proposal. He accepted with gratitude and married the princess to
his military right-hand man, Ngoza. Like Mswati, Moshoeshoe, self-made
king of the Basotho, realized the importance of Natal, especially after
Shepstone sent two regiments to aid his enemies in 1851.119 Moshoeshoe
had actively pursued alliances with the Cape Colony since 1835, only to
find his overtures rebuffed. A period of special danger began in 1845 when
the British placed a resident at Bloemfontein to represent their interests
on the Highveld. Hopes that a permanent alliance with the British might
develop were crushed when Resident Henry Warden drew a boundary
line that greatly diminished Moshoeshoe’s claims to the Caledon Valley.
Using his friendship with missionaries of the Paris Evangelical Missionary
Society, the king sent vigorous protests to Cape Town. However, he soon
discovered that the tide of missionary influence had greatly ebbed at the
Cape, particularly with the return of Sir Harry Smith. Although the new
governor had promised to reduce expenses and impose peace on the colony’s
troublesome frontiers, he soon revealed a very different personal agenda:
to bring peace through a bold annexation of territory north of the Orange
River.
British suzerainty to the north of the Orange River was limited to a treaty
concluded in 1834 with the leader of the western Griqua community under
Andries Waterboer and, two years later, the extension of the Cape of Good
Hope Punishment Act to cover the area south of twenty-five degrees south
latitude. In 1843, the British established similar treaties with Adam Kok at
Philippolis and Moshoeshoe at Thaba Nchu. Moshoeshoe and other chiefs
initially welcomed these attempts to bring order to the region as they
secured their own land claims and curbed those of the Boers. Smith, how-
ever, actively sought friendship with the Boers – notwithstanding the armed
resistance put up by Andries Pretorius at the Battle of Boomplaats in July
1848. After Pretorius and his diehards had retreated north of the Vaal River,
Smith appointed surveyors to carve arable land into farms throughout the
area he proclaimed as the Orange River Sovereignty. Smith endorsed War-
den’s policy of forming a coalition to oppose King Moshoeshoe’s pretensions
to dominance in the Caledon Valley. In 1851, Warden was ready to march
against the king with a combined force contributed by Sekonyela, Moroka,
Adam Kok, Andries Waterboer, and other minor chiefs. The ignominious
119Etherington, Great Treks, p. 318.
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failure of this assault was part of the reason that Harry Smith was recalled
as governor and his annexations on the Highveld were abandoned. A face-
saving expedition led by Smith’s replacement, Lt. Gen. George Cathcart,
partially redeemed Warden’s defeat and concluded a peace settlement with
Moshoeshoe in December 1852.
Britain’s withdrawal from the Highveld occurred in two stages. First,
the Sand River Convention of January 1852 relinquished all land north
of the Vaal River to the Krygsraad (war council) of scattered Boer com-
munities. Second, by the Bloemfontein Convention of February 1854, the
Orange River Sovereignty passed to a group representing British and Boer
settlers and was renamed the Orange Free State. All treaties previously
concluded between the Cape Colony and chiefs north of the Orange were
declared null and void. This obliged many groups to fend for themselves.
Moshoeshoe’s kingdom was once more left to its own devices. The king’s
first act was to sweep the Caledon Valley of his old enemies, leaving only
Boer farms undisturbed. Next, he resumed the program of economic devel-
opment and armament that had been the foundation of his success in the
1830s. The principal sources of wealth were wages earned by Basotho
men working in the Cape Colony and money earned from sales of grain.
Though these were substantial, they could not compare with the rev-
enue pouring into the coffers of the Orange Free State government, as
farms multiplied and the wool boom spread prosperity. War for posses-
sion of farmland west of the Caledon River broke out in 1865, and once
again Moshoeshoe put up surprisingly strong resistance against a combined
mounted force of Transvaal and Free State troops. For a time, it seemed
likely that Theophilus Shepstone would arrange a friendly occupation that
would put Moshoeshoe under a system of indirect rule similar to that prac-
ticed in Natal. In the end, a treaty of 1869 laid down the modern borders
of Lesotho and put the kingdom under British protection, but not under
Shepstone.
Griqua communities took another course after the extinction of the
Orange River Sovereignty. After a brief period of prosperity built on the
expanding ivory frontier and a wool boom, they began to find that their
Christian individualism put them at a disadvantage in dealings with immi-
grant farmers. Many succumbed to the temptation to sell or otherwise alien-
ate land, a trend that the weak Griqua institutions of government proved
unable to control. By 1861, about 2,000 Griqua decided to trek with Adam
Kok across the mountains of Lesotho to a new home in an area popularly
known as Nomansland, sandwiched between Faku’s Mpondo kingdom and
the colony of Natal. Although Natal had laid claim to the district, it had
not yet been subjected to formal rule, so the Griquas established their
position in “Griqualand East” through negotiation with Faku. The ironic
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result of their arduous trek was that they left their old homes just a few
years before the discovery of diamonds made Griqualand West one of the
most coveted regions on the face of the planet.120
EARLY DIAMOND DIGGING: THE DYNAMICS OF RACE, CLASS,
CULTURE, AND MONOPOLY CAPITALISM
Although the first diamond find occurred in 1867, near the confluence of
the Vaal and Hartz rivers, the decisive discovery occurred in 1870 when, for
the first time in history, a motherlode of diamonds lodged in the core of an
extinct volcano was found away from the river at Bultfontein. The following
year a richer deposit was discovered at nearby Colesberg Kopje and this
site, soon to be renamed the Kimberley mine, was “rushed” by prospective
diggers. By the end of the year the area had been annexed by Britain as
the colony of Griqualand West and fortune-seekers were streaming to the
four Kimberley mines (Kimberley, De Beers, Bultfontein, and Dutoitspan)
from many parts of Southern Africa and the world.
In the early days, few diggers could pay cash wages and they were obliged
to engage men under a share-working system. The high cost of mining
placed the small diggers under constant pressure to sell their claims to
larger, better-capitalized companies. This pressure increased as the pits grew
deeper and the cost of bringing blue ground to the surface rose proportion-
ately. By 1873, the Kimberley mine was 200 feet deep and covered about
ten acres. Steam engines powered the cars and buckets, drawn by a network
of steel wires and pulleys, that gave access to the mine and that allowed
excavated ground to be hauled to the surface. Steam pumped water out of
the pits, drove the washing machines, and allowed men to add increasingly
small diamonds to the stones they recovered at the sorting yards.
High wages added considerably to the cost of mining as employers had
to attract workers to Kimberley from areas as far removed as Cornwall,
England, and Mozambique; and frequently had to lodge and feed them in
the “compounds” built next to the yards in which they washed and sorted
through the excavated blue ground. Drawing men to the diggings was no
simple matter, especially as the deepest and most profitable of the four
pits became the most dangerous mine in the world. For migrant workers,
going to Kimberley was very much a lottery. Traveling overland entailed
enormous risks as men faced swollen rivers, severe cold, long distances
without food, water, or fuel; and were assailed by wild animals and bandits.
As the pits grew deeper they suffered from landslides and flooding, as well
120R. Ross, Adam Kok’s Griquas: a study in the development of stratification in South Africa
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 94–100.
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figure 7.3. Diamond fields.
as numerous accidents caused by misfired charges or the unequal working
of claims. The unhygienic conditions at the diggings bred diseases like
dysentery, typhoid, and, especially, pneumonia. Epidemics of small pox
and bubonic plague were never far off.
In these conditions, diggers found it difficult to discipline workers who
sought to improve their conditions of work by stealing diamonds or by
“deserting,” to secure higher wages or simply escape a brutal situation.
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Many workers attempted to break a foreign and inhuman rhythm of labor
by turning to alcohol; but in the process they often injured themselves,
broke their equipment or, most seriously, failed in large numbers to appear
for work at the start of the week. The Saint Monday phenomenon, typical
of the early stages of mining in many parts of the world, became a marker
of life at Kimberley as men sought refuge in inebriation and, through the
practice of commensality, tried to forge identities that were serviceable to
life on the diggings.
Race and class became important issues. As individuals and companies
started to buy out the small claim holders, the diggers attempted to exclude
men of color from owning claims and to confine them to the role of manual
labor. The confrontation between capitalists and claim-owners exploded in
mid-1875 when the diggers attempted to ensure their position by seizing
the government of Griqualand West. The crushing of the “Black Flag”
revolt by the British army had two important consequences: On the one
hand, it caused the government to accede to the diggers’ demands to
prohibit people of color from holding diggers’ licenses, whereas on the
other hand it was a major defeat for the small diggers as it brought in
a government favorable to the amalgamation of claims in the hands of
large-scale capitalists.121 The hostility between African and white workers
grew as whites came to depend on wages for their survival whereas most
African workers retained a separate means of production in the rural areas.
This meant that the interests of the working class were strictly divided by
race; for although whites sought to protect their wages through organized
labor combinations and the protection of individual rights, Africans found
a more coherent defense of their working conditions in their ability to
return home, a strategy that employers saw as “desertion.”
African mine workers brought a rural culture to the mines and ordered
their lives in ways that were often very different from those of European
proletarians. Many came from societies with little or no experience of indi-
vidual rights. In the rural areas, authoritarian chiefs and elders tended
to dominate the lives of young men and shape their views on labor and
how it should be performed. This had different consequences: in the Zulu
kingdom the freedom with which young men moved onto the labor mar-
ket was restricted by their obligation to provide the king with labor and
military service. However, in most areas chiefs encouraged the emigra-
tion of labor, either by sending parties to the mines, by “selling” men to
recruiters, or by taxing them on their return. In a few instances these men
were servile laborers, sometimes even slaves. This frequently caused the
121R. Turrell, Capital and Labour on the Kimberley Diamond Fields, 1871–1890 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), Chapter 3.
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chief to determine the freedom with which men sold their labor, as well
as the expected conditions under which they would work at Kimberley.
The notion of work carried to the mines by these men was also shaped by
an agricultural economy that demanded seasonal bursts of communal labor
that, in turn, were dependent on sociability and leisure. On the Kimberly
diggings, this concept of work frequently contradicted the employers’ idea
that costly machines should determine the rhythm and pace of labor. Nor
was the length of time migrants were willing to stay at the diggings,
and acquire mining skills, determined by Europeans’ sense of the need to
accumulate capital. Few African workers were driven to work, as was the
case with many Europeans, by a dependence on a range of expensive com-
modities. Mostly, they worked a few weeks or months to earn the money
needed to buy familiar products, such as clothing and imported liquor or
perhaps beads and knives. Many bought guns at Kimberley with which
they defended their independence and hunted game. The consumer needs
of black workers grew as they came into contact with the Kimberley High
Street-in-Africa; and their requirements spread into the rural areas when
they returned to their villages laden with goods. Traders quickly gauged
this new opportunity for wealth and moved into remote rural areas where
they traded from their wagons or established stores and canteens. In some
areas, men were pushed to the mines by the need to acquire a commodity
with a special, local value. The Bapedi and Basotho particularly valued guns
as a means of defending themselves against Boer aggression, whereas men
in southern Mozambique used their wages to buy iron hoes with which
they could acquire wives and the munificence needed to draw a follow-
ing. But these demands could change suddenly. In the mid-1870s, French
traders sought to benefit from the market for iron hoes at Lourenc¸o Marques
(Maputo) by manufacturing huge numbers of these items in Marseilles. The
unimpeded importation of hoes caused a severe inflation in the brideprice
and, eventually, to the adoption of gold coins as a more stable medium
of bridewealth. By the early 1880s, Tsonga-speaking workers from south-
ern Mozambique started to replace Sotho and Pedi workers at Kimberley
who, recently conquered, were prohibited from acquiring guns. Almost
everywhere, cyclical droughts and famines pushed men to the mines where
they worked for as long as it took to earn the wages that would ensure the
survival of their families back home.122
The process of amalgamation on the mines, whereby companies absorbed
small claims into their holdings, sped up in the early 1880s as the price
of diamonds collapsed just as working tunnels were driven under the
122P. Harries, Work, Culture and Identity: Migrant Labourers in Mozambique and South Africa,
c. 1860–1910 (London: Heinemann, 1994), pp. 86–90, 98–9.
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Kimberley “big hole” and the cost of mining operations soared. This
resulted in a spate of bankruptcies and takeovers; and the process of amal-
gamation grew as it became clear that, if one company could exercise a
monopoly over the sale of diamonds, it would be able to determine the
price of the stones worldwide. The mine owners also attempted to curtail
the theft of diamonds by introducing strip searching, a practice almost
entirely restricted to black miners, and by establishing special IDB (illicit
diamond buying) courts. They also attempted to enclose black workers’ liv-
ing quarters within compounds in such a way as to isolate men from their
sources of liquor, prevent them from deserting, and stop them from smug-
gling diamonds to illicit buyers. The first closed compound was erected
in 1885 and, four years later, when C. J. Rhodes succeeded in placing all
four mines under his De Beers Consolidated Mines, there were seventeen
of these structures at Kimberley.123 This greatly expanded the impact of
migrant labor on family life, as men in the compounds lived entirely away
from the company of women for long periods. Conversely, women in areas
of high labor recruitment had to adapt to life with fewer young men. Yet
at the same time, many rural families benefited from the growing market
for their goods, largely maize and cattle, presented by growing towns and
other centers of employment.124
This new form of monopoly capitalism would exercise a strong influ-
ence on labor relations in South Africa. It produced a class of industri-
alists, like Rhodes, J. B. Robinson, Abe Bailey, and Max Michaelis, who
would invest heavily in the public institutions and politics of white South
Africa.125 Their influence, as distinctly South African capitalists, would
soon impress itself on life on the Witwatersrand. The militancy of white
workers at Kimberley was curbed as employers drew them into racially
defined positions as supervisors of black labor. In this way, white workers
were separated, both spatially and in terms of their interests and culture,
from migrant black workers in the compounds. De Beers further domes-
ticated white workers and separated them from their potential black class
123W. Worger, South Africa’s City of Diamonds: Mine Workers and Monopoly Capitalism in
Kimberley, 1867–1895 (New Haven: Yale University Press and Johannesburg: Ravan
Press, 1987), Chapters 5 and 6.
124C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (London: Heinemann,
1979), Chapter 3; K. Shillington, The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana, 1870–1900
( Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985), pp. 62–70; W. Beinart, The Political Economy of
Pondoland 1860 to 1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 22–30.
See also note 142 following.
125R. Rotberg,The Founder: Cecil JohnRhodes and the Pursuit of Power ( Johannesburg: Southern
Book Publishers, 1988).
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allies through an active policy of industrial paternalism.126 A small black
middle class started to emerge in parts of Kimberley in the early 1880s.
Men who had acquired a degree of education in mission schools at the
diggings or elsewhere found work as clerks, supervisors, or translators for
mining companies, trading establishments, and, especially, the telegraph
office. Some would establish families at Kimberley and contribute to the
broad, British imperial culture of the town.127
Black workers continued to be drawn to Kimberley by competitive
working conditions. Even as the compounds closed in the mid-to-late
1880s, few companies had to buy labor from recruiters as was the practice
in other parts of South Africa. Instead, they kept wages sufficiently high
to draw men away from other major employers of labor, such as the sugar
plantations in Natal, the railways, harbors in the Cape, and gold mines
of the eastern Transvaal. They initially allowed men in the compounds to
consume strictly controlled amounts of alcohol and sometimes allowed
them to spend weekends in town. Employers also encouraged black miners
to engage in an extensive penny capitalism in the compounds and, through
the initiation of work tickets and task work, as well as short work contracts,
allowed men to influence the pace at which they labored as well as the
duration of their contracts. However, although miners were still able to
influence both the pace and rhythm of labor, and the general conditions of
their work, the prison-like compounds introduced a new and frightening
level of control over their working lives. This new discipline contributed
to a sharp rise in productivity as, during the period 1882–92, the output
of Kimberley mine workers doubled.
Mine workers returned home with wages, ideas, and experiences that
introduced a new turbulence into rural society. Many came into contact
with Christianity on the diggings; either directly, through evangelizing
ministers, or through the written and sung texts that circulated in their
living quarters and public spaces. Missionaries viewed the diggings as a
prime position for evangelical work. This was partly because miners were
in need of spiritual support, but mainly because they carried the Christian
message into distant rural areas where, following religious texts or simply
inspired by hymns, they could await the coming of a missionary. Kimberley
was not simply a center for the accumulation of capital; it was also a space in
126A. Mabin, “Labour, capital, class struggle, and the origins of residential segregation in
Kimberley, 1880–1920,” Journal of Historical Geography, 12, 1 (1986).
127R. Turrell, Capital and Labour on the Kimberley Diamond Fields (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), pp. 184–94; B. Willan, Sol Plaate: a Biography ( Johannesburg:
Ravan Press, 1984), pp. 29–30.
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which men learned new skills, such as reading, and acquired new identities,
such as those associated with ethnicity, Christianity, and class.
DIAMONDS: THE SHORT- AND LONG-TERM IMPACT
At the structural level, development of the diamond fields accelerated some
forces for change that were already present and launched other entirely
new forces that permanently altered the course of South African history.
In the short run, the demand for labor pushed up wages and expanded
markets for African agricultural production. This in turn enabled the more
powerful independent kingdoms and chieftaincies to push ahead with pro-
grams of military modernization designed to strengthen their defensive
and offensive capabilities. Labor recruiters and gunrunners flourished in
the independent kingdoms. British authorities reacted to the challenge
with measures designed to disarm the most formidable of those states and
to bring them under imperial control. Important streams of migrant labor
passed through the independent republics of the Transvaal and the Orange
Free State, Basotholand, and the colony of Natal, showing that a single
regional economy had emerged.128 As a result there was a renewed impe-
rial interest to bring those states into a general federation under British
sovereignty. The diamond fields also provided opportunities for small-scale
African entrepreneurs already involved in the capitalist economy. Peas-
ant producers prospered in many areas, especially those associated with
Christian missions. Others built up preexisting operations as traders and
transport riders. Groups of peasants banded together to buy land outside the
reserves. Growth in paid employment was not limited to the mines them-
selves. Dockyards, roads, railways, and other infrastructure expanded to
meet the needs of the mining industry as a whole. In some segments
of the economy, workers for the first time discovered the power to bet-
ter themselves through strikes and other forms of industrial action. The
specter of worker power frightened many large- and small-scale employers
who pushed for legislation to provide more control over the workforce.
The development of closed compounds at the diamond fields provided
the most extreme example of a captive labor force and set an example
that other industries would attempt to imitate. Structural change was, of
course, accompanied by social and cultural change. Settler communities
showed unmistakable signs of unease, which manifested itself in moral
panics over an alleged increase in crime, especially in relation to white
128Delius, The Land Belongs to Us, Chapter 3; A. Kirkaldy, Capturing the Soul: The Vhavenda
and the Missionaries, 1870–1900 (Pretoria: Protea Book House, 2005), pp. 38–43.
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females. As young African men gained experience of migrant labor, they
found opportunities to escape control by older men and chiefs. Cash in
hand gave some young men unprecedented independence in contracting
marriages. A few young women also found ways of circumventing parental
authority, leading to a general feeling among older men that they were
losing control over production and reproduction – an anxiety that fre-
quently expressed itself in laments that young people had abandoned all
morality.
These interlinked structural and cultural shifts underlay – but did not
determine – the unfolding of events in the 1870s. These depended, as
always, on contingent factors of people, ideas, and politics. Britain’s annex-
ation of the diamond fields in August 1871 and the Cape’s incorporation
of Basotholand a few months later had provoked Boer opposition to the
idea of federation. Although Natal was too far from the action to join the
unseemly struggles to lay claim to the diamond fields, the mining revo-
lution nonetheless profoundly affected the colony. Individuals closed their
businesses and went to seek their fortune, including the editor of the Natal
Witness newspaper, and the brothers Herbert and Cecil Rhodes, who had
been experimenting with cotton farming. Promoters of trade and transport
hoped to make Durban the preferred point of entry to the Highveld and
looked for ways to extend railways beyond the Drakensberg. Farmers, on
the other hand, looked on with dismay as they saw their workforces walk
away in search of higher wages. In the early days of the diamond rush,
diggers had no time for the cheap labor policies practiced on settler farms.
They needed workers immediately and paid whatever was asked. This not
only caused men from Natal to trek off to the mines, it also threatened to
divert established streams of migrant labor away from Natal. The unset-
tling effects of these developments may have underpinned South Africa’s
first “black peril” scare, which gripped white settlers in Natal from about
1869–73. Although no statistical evidence pointed to an upsurge of sexual
assaults on white women, newspapers and politicians demanded action in
the form of harsher penalties for black males guilty of actual or attempted
rape. In line with the prevailing double standard, nothing whatever was
said about white males assaulting black women – a much more common
phenomenon.
Signs of increasing unease and internal tensions also appeared in the
Zulu kingdom, even though it sent few workers to the diamond fields.
Although the amaZulu lacked the resources necessary to arm themselves
on the scale of other regional powers, observers noted a buildup of both
guns and horses. Boer farmers from the southeastern Transvaal had been
encroaching on the western borders of the kingdom since the late 1850s
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and it was quite conceivable that a war like that fought between the Boers
and Basotho could break out at any time. It was obvious that old king
Mpande had not long to live; Cetshwayo still felt some insecurity about the
succession and worried that potential rivals may have been strengthening
their capacity for independent action. All the amaZulu knew very well
that chiefs such as Moshoeshoe, Soshangane, Sekhukhune, and Swazi king
Ludvonga had been arming themselves with modern weapons. Rumors of
war circulated constantly. What none of the independent kingdoms could
know was that the British Empire was about to embark on a path that
would reduce them all to a state of dependence.
The unexpected spark that set the process in motion was struck on
the slopes of the Drakensberg in Natal where Langalibalele’s amaHlubi
people had been enjoying twenty-five years of uninterrupted peace and
prosperity.129 By 1873, the venerable chief had fifty-four sons, sixty-eight
daughters, and vast herds of cattle. Some of the Hlubi young men had also
traveled to the diamond fields and, like young Sotho and Pedi workers,
had returned home with money to spend and guns to show off. Whereas
Shepstone had made no serious effort to disarm the populations of the
reserves, he had attempted to monitor gun ownership by requiring chiefs
to register all firearms in their territories. John Macfarlane, the magistrate
charged with oversight of Langalibalele, reported that many firearms had
not been registered (including those brought back by Hlubi men who
had accompanied Shepstone’s son, George, on a fortune-seeking expedi-
tion to the diamond fields). In the edgy atmosphere of 1873 what might
have been treated as an insignificant misdemeanor escalated into an armed
confrontation. Soon after Macfarlane issued his first order that chief bring
in his guns, the annual manuevers of the Natal volunteer militia was held
nearby, an event that Langalibalele wrongly interpreted as preparation for
an attack on his people. Natal settlers were themselves nervous about the
state of Zululand following the death of Mpande. Having accepted an invi-
tation to witness the installation of Cetshwayo as king, Shepstone decided
the time was ripe for a display of colonial power and marched into Zululand
at the head of a large armed column in August. Many feared that the troops
might be heading into a trap, Shepstone returned safely, having announced
that he had given laws to the new king. In mid-October he sent one of his
right-hand men, Mahoiza, to demand that Langalibalele come immediately
to Pietermaritzburg. Seeing that white farmers in the district had started
moving their cattle out of harm’s way, the chief decided he was about to
be killed and tried to flee over the mountains to Lesotho. On Shepstone’s
129N. Etherington, “Why Langalibalele Ran Away,” Journal of Natal and Zulu History
(1978), 1, pp. 1–25.
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advice, Natal’s governor, Benjamin Pine, sent an expeditionary force to
punish the chief for the “crime” of attempting to leave the colony without
permission. In a skirmish at the top of Bushmen’s River Pass, four of the
Natal troopers died, a misfortune that turned the expedition into a ferocious
campaign of revenge marked by hideous atrocities such as the dynamiting
of caves where Hlubi people had taken refuge. Following his capture on
December 11, a forlorn Langalibalele was bound and taken for trial to the
capital along roads lined by jeering settlers. Instead of trying the chief by
British law with a jury, Shepstone invoked his version of Native Law and
had Langalibalele condemned by a panel of chiefs headed by Governor Pine
as titular supreme chief of the African people of Natal.
Because it epitomized all the currents of change swirling through the
subcontinent and exposed central contradictions and anomalies in Britain’s
colonial policy, the misnamed rebellion became the occasion for agonized
reappraisals in many quarters. Even before the crisis, the chiefs of Natal
had begun to grumble about increased taxes. Now as they watched Hlubi
herds and women led away in triumph by Shepstone’s henchmen, the chiefs
of Natal understood as never before the fragility of their own position. At
the same time, the merits of Shepstone’s system itself were being called
into question at the heart of the British Empire. Appalled by the punitive
expedition and the trial, Bishop Colenso abruptly terminated his long-
standing friendship with the secretary for native affairs and set out to enlist
what remained of the humanitarian/missionary lobby in a campaign to
quash Langalibalele’s sentence. Britain’s House of Lords burst into amused
guffaws when told that the governor of Natal, who was supposed to be
conveying the blessings of European civilization to Africa, had taken up a
position as a supreme chief. Benjamin Disraeli, who had led his Conserva-
tive Party to triumph at the general election of 1874, now faced the problem
of putting into practice the high-flown rhetoric about the glories of empire
he had lauded in a famous speech at the Crystal Palace in 1872. The task of
balancing the needs of imperial defense, economic development, support
for white settlers, and humane administration fell to Lord Carnarvon, the
secretary of state for colonies. Taking up a policy of grouping small colonies
into larger, self-sufficient states that had begun with the Confederation of
Canada in 1867 and had already been discussed in relation to South Africa,
Carnarvon set out to bring the Cape Colony, Natal, and the independent
Boer Republics under a single government. But first he had to do something
about Bishop Colenso’s grave allegations. To gain an independent source
of advice, Carnarvon commissioned historian James Anthony Froude to
go on a fact-finding tour of South Africa. Not long after, Shepstone and
Colenso arrived in London to give their own versions of the Langalibalele
affair and recommendations for the future of South Africa.
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As a result, Carnarvon had the benefit of three very different points of
view. Froude articulated the most advanced views on racial science. Like
his mentor, Thomas Carlyle, Froude dismissed Africans as people only fit
for servitude and lauded white settlers – especially those descended from
the Dutch – as a progressive force. Colenso, in contrast, argued on the
base of abstract jurisprudence and tedious examination of evidence that
nothing less than full restoration of Langalibalele to his chieftainship and
the complete overthrow of the Shepstone system would vindicate Britain’s
claim to be the trustee of African welfare. Shepstone employed more subtle
reasoning. Experience had taught him that Froude’s trust in white settlers
was misplaced. Certainly, a settler-dominated government in Natal could
not be trusted to look after African interests. Only a firm but fair admin-
istration – such as his own – that understood African ways of life and
thought could keep the peace and steer South Africa toward federation and
a better life for all. Carnarvon drew something from each of these points of
view. He was inclined to agree with Froude that Afrikaans-speaking people
must be conciliated. He agreed with Colenso that Natal’s administration
of the African population was in urgent need of reform. But most of all,
Shepstone bewitched Carnarvon with his apparent knowledge, wisdom, and
broad view of South African affairs. Carnarvon’s first move was to announce
his intention to bring the colonies and republics into a confederation. Sec-
ond, he dispatched the empire’s most successful young general, Sir Garnet
Wolseley, to deal with the unreliable colonists of Natal by persuading them
to give up their limited powers of self-government. Third, as a signal of
Britain’s humanitarian intentions, he appointed Sir Bartle Frere, a noted
champion of antislavery agitation and missions, to be high commissioner
of South Africa. Finally, Carnarvon bestowed a knighthood on Theophilus
Shepstone and sent him to the Transvaal, charged with a secret commission
to annex the nearly bankrupt republic should circumstances appear propi-
tious. Important as these agents would prove in their individual capacities,
they must not be allowed to obscure the central importance of Carvarvon
himself, a man too often dismissed by his political contemporaries and
underestimated by historians. No one in Britain in the 1870s took a more
ambitious approach to African affairs. Disraeli talked grandly about an
imperial mission, but Carnarvon laid out the road map for achieving an
empire stretching from Cape to Cairo. For strategic reasons Britain must
safeguard the Suez Canal, in East Africa it must support measures designed
to suppress the slave trade and close the door to potential European colo-
nial rivals, and the emerging regional economy of mining, trade, and labor
migration must be brought under a single British government. In a most
revealing statement on Britain’s destiny in Central Africa made in 1876 he
told Bartle Frere:
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I should not like anyone to come too near to us either on the south towards the
Transvaal, which must be ours; or on the north too near Egypt and the country
which belongs to Egypt. In fact when I speak of geographical limits I am not
expressing my real opinion. We cannot admit rivals in the east or even the central
part of Africa: and I do not see why, looking to the experience we now have of
English life within the tropics – the Zambezi should be considered to be without
the range of our colonisation. To a considerable extent, if not entirely, we must be
prepared to apply a sort of Munro [sic] doctrine to much of Africa.130
A comparably frank statement of his policy for the control of labor in
Southern Africa expressed Carnarvon’s intention to implement in every
territory “a common system of treatment which shall be clear of the reproach
of a system of servitude, and yet shall put that moral screw on the native
which is desirable for the safety and interest of all parties.”131
Of all the pieces in his confederation puzzle, Natal’s settlers proved
easiest to fit in place. Privately contemptuous of Natal’s settlers but gracious
and charming in public, Garnet Wolseley soon convinced the Legislative
Assembly to adopt a “Jamaican” constitution that gave appointed officials
a decisive say in government. At the same time, he drew on his military
knowledge to make recommendations on defense. In his opinion the Zulu
kingdom posed a menace that could hardly be challenged by the forces
currently stationed in Natal. Shepstone went to the Transvaal in 1877 with
the Zulu threat as the trump card that he hoped would persuade the Boers to
seek the shelter of British administration. At a time when the South African
Republic teetered on the brink of bankruptcy and seemed to be losing a war
against Sekhukhune’s Pedi kingdom, Shepstone had good reasons to hope
for success. Instead of following Wolseley’s example and securing a formal
agreement to a British takeover, Shepstone simply raised the Union Jack
and annexed the Transvaal in April 1877 – just nine days before Bartle Frere
arrived in Cape Town to assume the post of high commissioner. Frere faced
grave problems from the moment he stepped ashore. The Cape legislature
was torn by internal divisions and in no mood to rubber stamp his plans for
confederation. A petty squabble on the eastern frontier in 1877 provoked
the Ninth Frontier War with the amaXhosa. This led the Cape government
to introduce a form of indirect rule in the recently conquered areas of the
Transkei and, at the same time, to bring Griqualand West under its control.
Meanwhile, the Cape’s administration of Basotholand had proved a dismal
failure and a crisis was coming to a head over the same issue that had undone
130Carnarvon to Frere, December 12, 1876, Carnarvon Papers, PRO 30/6/4.
131Carnarvon to Froude September 2, 1875, quoted in R. Cope. Ploughshare of War: The
Origins of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press,
1999), p. 83.
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Langalibalele: guns. According to Shepstone, the “Zulu menace” identified
by Wolseley was only one part of a larger, darker picture. He told Frere
that his extensive intelligence network had uncovered a plot by all the large
African kingdoms to combine in a general war on the Europeans. The key to
winning the hearts of farmers and burghers in the Transvaal was to remove
this threat before it exploded. Frere extended Shepstone’s reasoning, linking
the success of Carnarvon’s confederation policy to a general disarmament of
the independent kingdoms.
The kingdoms themselves had little or no idea of the workings of British
officialdom. Although in touch with each other on a certain formal level, the
kings had no plot for a combined rising in a general war. On the contrary,
they saw themselves as engaged in desperate individual races to build up
their own defensive strength to counter European aggression. Good social
histories of life within the kingdoms in this period have yet to be written,
probably because the common people of South Africa had little or no oppor-
tunity to influence the overall course of events. Most historical writing on
the causes of the wave of war and conquest that swept across South Africa
between 1876 and 1882 has emphasized the local factors that precipitated
conflict. Undeniably local circumstances shaped local outcomes, but the
overwhelming factor at work was the determination of Britain’s Conser-
vative government to bring about confederation through a process that
involved neutering or destroying the military power of African kingdoms.
Frere and the generals accomplished the military objective – though with
far more difficulty than they had anticipated. However, the grand design
itself was clearly unraveling by 1879. It fell apart completely when William
Gladstone won the British general election of 1880 on an anti-imperialist
platform promising to terminate ill-conceived overseas adventures.
The ruin of the confederation scheme commenced in the Transvaal.
Within months of the annexation, dissidents were scheming to undo it.
Though their petitions fell on deaf ears, they influenced Shepstone to make
conciliation of the Boers the keystone of his administration. As a result,
he neglected to implement the combination of indirect rule and hut tax
collection that had been the foundation of his success in Natal. Instead of
saving the Transvaal from bankruptcy, he piled up debts. Shepstone had
never been very good at cultivating settlers in Natal; he did much worse in
the Transvaal.132 He promised to bring peace and security on the eastern
frontier without explaining his program. Lacking the resources to strike
a decisive blow against Sekhukhune, he let the Pedi war smoulder while
he devoted his attentions to scoring a triumph in the Zulu kingdom that
132 I. R. Smith, The Origins of the South African War 1899–1902 (London: Longman, 1996),
pp. 25–30.
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would demonstrate the blessings of British rule. In Natal he had taken the
side of Mpande against the Transvaal settlers squatting on Zulu territory. As
administrator of the Transvaal he reversed his opinion, claiming to have seen
documents in Pretoria that confirmed the Boer claims. He opened secret
lines of communication to missionaries and other opponents of Cetshwayo’s
rule, promising that sometime soon soldiers would come to overthrow the
king.
Dissatisfied with the independent line taken on the war and confeder-
ation by Cape Colony Prime Minister John Molteno, Frere peremptorily
dismissed him and brought in a more tractable ministry led by Gordon
Sprigg. It had become evident that Frere would pursue confederation at any
cost. The scale of warfare conducted all over Southeastern Africa during his
high commissionership dwarfed all previous conflicts in the region. Only
the colonial habit of blaming all wars on African aggression and later histo-
rians’ tendency to treat the history of Southern Africa on a region-by-region
basis have prevented these conflicts from getting the label they deserve: the
First British War for South African Unification (1877–82).
In February 1878, Sekhukhune signaled his intention to resist Transvaal
demands for land, the admission of mineral prospectors and taxes with
a renewal of armed struggle. Across the Highveld, Griqua and Tlhaping
protests against the annexation of their territories along with the diamond
fields led to another outbreak of fighting that continued through most
of the year. For Frere, however, the main event on the schedule remained
the Zulu kingdom. A boundary commission set up to pronounce on the
respective claims of Cetshwayo and the Boers on the Transvaal frontier
delivered an unexpected decision in favor of the Zulu king in June 1878.
Frere reversed the practical effect of the ruling by extending British pro-
tection over all settler farms in the district, even those technically in the
Zulu kingdom.133 In December of the same year, Frere issued an ulti-
matum to Cetshwayo demanding nothing less than the destruction of
the entire Zulu military organization – the cement that had bound the
kingdom together since its foundation. Such proceedings in the 1830s
would have been likely to provoke strong protests from humanitarian and
missionary societies. On this occasion, divisions within the philanthropic
camp rendered them largely ineffective. With the exception of Lesotho,
the independent kingdoms had responded to Christian missionaries with
a mixture of indifference and hostility. Many missionaries had arrived at
133Colin Webb, “The Origins of the Anglo-Zulu War,” in A. Duminy and C. Ballard (Eds.),
The Anglo-ZuluWar: New Perspectives (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1981),
pp. 4–5; C. Hamilton, Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical
Invention (Cape Town: David Philip, 1998), pp. 104–06.
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the conclusion that only conquest would open the door for conversions.
Like many of his colleagues on the eastern frontier, the Anglican Bishop of
St. John’s, Kaffraria, Henry Callaway hailed war as “the God-sent power”
effecting change, and predicted that whites would soon govern all of South-
ern Africa “not only with kindness and justice, but with the firm hand of the
law.”134 All the Hermannsburg Lutheran missionaries made an ostentatious
departure from the Zulu kingdom in 1877, loudly complaining of perse-
cution. Anglican priest Robert Robertson wrote anonymous despatches to
a Natal paper describing Cetshwayo’s “tyranny and injustice.”135 Only a
few missionaries stood out against the tide. Norwegian Hans Schreuder
stayed in the Zulu kingdom pleading on Cetshwayo’s behalf for peace even
as British troops approached. Bishop Colenso also sought a diplomatic
solution, though his intervention came much too late. Frere ignored all
Cetshwayo’s messages, refusing to accept anything short of full compliance
with his impossible ultimatum. On its expiry, January 11, 1879, Frere put
the fate of his grand design in the hands of the generals, as three columns
of British soldiers moved across the Thukela. Contrary to the expectations
of those who believed in the myth of a general South African rising, the
Zulu forces made no move toward Natal, taking up a purely defensive
posture.
No one knew how well the amaZulu would perform, as they had not
engaged in serious campaigns since the civil war of 1856; even the oldest
of them were too young to remember facing the Boers at Ncome River.
They lacked experience with the guns and horses they possessed, so the
fortunes of battle would depend on fitness gained through dance compe-
titions, the force of their numbers, and blind luck.136 On January 22, on
the slopes of Isandhlwana hill, luck favored the amaZulu when their esti-
mated force of 20,000 overran a British encampment, annihilating in less
than two hours one-third of the column under commander-in-chief, Lord
Chelmsford. That one engagement shook the military self-confidence of
the world’s largest empire and ensured the Zulu warrior a permanent place
in the annals of military glory. More books and articles have been written
on the war than any other aspect of Zulu history, most of them focusing on
battles, tactics, and strategy. Few of them address at all the central question
posed by the Zulu defense. Why were so many willing to fight and die
when the chances of victory were so slight? Tradition is sufficient answer
134M. Benham, Henry Callaway (London: Macmillan, 1896), pp. 309–10, 322–4.
D. Chidester, Religions of South Africa (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 41.
135Etherington, Preachers, Peasants and Politics in Southeast Africa, pp. 44–5.
136J. Laband, Kingdom in Crisis: The Zulu Response to the British Invasion of 1879 (Pietermar-
itzburg: University of Natal Press, 1992), Chapter 3.
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for military historians but in the broader context of South African history
another hypothesis worth considering is that the sad experience of British
campaigns against Xhosa chiefs and people taught others what they might
expect. Since the 1830s, the most devastating tactic employed by British
and colonial forces had been the burning of crops and capture of cattle.
Every Zulu family knew that a similar campaign in their country would
destroy not only their livelihoods but the basis of all family life, prestige,
and prosperity. Fortunately, victory at Isandhwana largely spared them that
catastrophe. Public opinion in Britain sought scapegoats, and the Conser-
vative government moved to distance itself from Frere’s grand design. A
shrewdly calculated release of documents falsely suggested that the Colo-
nial Office tried to head off an invasion of Zululand. Garnet Wolseley was
sent back to South Africa as commander-in-chief and high commissioner
for Southeastern Africa, effectively superseding both Lord Chelmsford and
Bartle Frere. Chelmsford, instead of employing the slash and burn tac-
tics the amaZulu feared, rushed to score a face-saving victory before his
replacement could arrive. This he claimed to have achieved in the battle of
Ulundi at Cetshwayo’s headquarters. The engagement lasted less than an
hour, resulting in Zulu losses of something between 1,000 and 1,500 men.
It was thus hardly decisive in real terms, but it laid the basis for Wolseley
to make peace with many of the leading chiefs while dropping many of the
conditions specified in Frere’s original ultimatum.137 Wolseley’s private
journal entry for August 4, 1879, disclosed the real attitude he took to
South African affairs, even as he bowed to current political imperatives.
Up to now beyond shooting and wounding some 10,000 men, we have not nearly
punished the people as a nation, and our leniency in now allowing all the people to
return to their kraals, retaining all their cattle may possibly be mistaken for fear.
I should therefore like to let loose the Swazis upon these northern tribes at once,
But I have to think of the howling societies at home who have sympathy with all
black men whilst they care nothing for the miseries and cruelties inflicted upon
their own kith & kin who have the misfortune to be located near these interesting
niggers.138
Wolseley no doubt exaggerated the influence of the humanitarian move-
ment but understood that his job was to get Britain out of the Zulu king-
dom. With Cetshwayo captured on August 28, Wolseley set out to achieve
a missionary-free settlement for Zululand. With the advice of John Dunn, a
white man who had previously served as one of Cetshwayo’s chiefs, Wolse-
ley dismembered the kingdom into thirteen small chieftainships – the
137J. Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom (London: Longman, 1979), pp. 58–9.
138A. Preston (Ed.), The South African Journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley 1879–1880 (Cape Town:
A. A. Balkema, 1973).
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largest of which fell to Dunn himself. For neither the first nor the last time
in history, the imperial authorities responsible for an unpopular and messy
war concealed their failures under the guise of restoring self-government.
The consequence was that whereas Bishop Colenso launched a campaign
to free Cetshwayo from exile and Robben Island, a powerful struggle in
the Zulu kingdom laid the groundwork for a disastrous civil war that
would end in the annexation of the territory to Natal in 1887. Meanwhile,
another sector of Frere’s far flung battle line needed attention – one on
which Wolseley could “let loose the Swazis.”
Transvaal military operations against Sekhukhune had been suspended
during the Zulu campaign. The Pedi kingdom took advantage of lull
by shoring up their defenses and plainly stating their determination to
resist any attempt to impose the Shepstone system. Sekhukhune’s envoys
declared:
. . . they will never be subject to the English who compel their subjects to build
forts and work for them; that the English are liars, that rather than be in the
position of the subject tribes they will fight, that they won’t pay taxes before they
had a good fight for it.139
They correctly surmised that the Zulu kingdom had not been truly defeated,
asking “how it was that cattle were not to be seen in the towns for sale, and
how was it that prisoners were not sent to work on the road.” For decades,
the Swazi kingdom had sought to neutralize the threat of the Pedi king-
dom to the north and the amaZulu to the east by allying themselves to the
Transvaal. When Wolseley determined to attack the Bapedi, King Mam-
puru brought 8,000 Swazi men to the battlefield. Their attack from the
rear made all the difference to Wolseley’s successful assault on November
26, 1879. After the loss of perhaps a thousand dead, Sekhukhune surren-
dered and was taken off to join Langalibalele and Cetshwayo on Robben
Island.140 According to the blueprint devised by Shepstone and Frere, that
ought to have been enough to demonstrate to white farmers in the Transvaal
the “blessings” of British rule. To their considerable astonishment, it put
the final nail in the coffin of confederation. Since the second occupation
of the Cape in 1805, British policy in South Africa had been grounded
on the premise that winning the allegiance of the settler population of
Dutch and Huguenot descent was essential to the peace and prosperity
of the colony. Even when all the evidence pointed to the futility of the
policy, officials in the Cape and in London clung to the ideal. Under Harry
139Delius, The Land Belongs to Us, pp. 242–3. At this time the threat of the Shepstone
system was present in the form of the chief diplomatic agents, both of whom came from
Natal, Marshall Clarke, and Shepstone’s son Henrique.
140 Ibid., 245.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521517942.008
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 14 Dec 2017 at 11:18:22, subject to the Cambridge Core
From Colonial Hegemonies to Imperial Conquest, 1840–1880 387
Smith in the 1840s, the interests of all African kings and chiefs had been
subordinated to that objective. Frere and Shepstone went down the same
road, given added scholarly encouragement from Froude who assured them
that their policy was grounded in scientific facts about race. Unfortunately,
the leaders of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic had
a different dream. Forty years’ experience with independence had bred a
self-confidence that was already blossoming into a sense of national iden-
tity and destiny.141 Already people resented the label Boer and some had
begun to speak of themselves as Afrikaners (or Afrikanders). The removal of
threats from African kingdoms did not lead to faith in British leadership,
but rather a sense that independence might now be reclaimed. Shepstone
was not revered as a savior; he was reviled as a tax collector. In December
1879, 6,000 Transvaal farmers and burghers gathered at Wonderfontein
and hoisted the Vierkleur, the flag of independence.
Elsewhere, the last of the wars launched on behalf of confederation and
African disarmament had already begun in Lesotho, a territory theoretically
under the protection of the Cape Colony, where the sons of Moshoeshoe were
divided among themselves. Following the terms of the misnamed Peace
Preservation Bill of 1878, the Cape Colony demanded that all Africans
hand in their arms. An initial campaign in November 1879 was followed
by a doubling of hut taxes and a general declaration of war in April 1880. By
that time, the doom of Frere’s grand design had been sealed by Gladstone’s
triumph in the British general election. Committed to a retreat from
imperial adventures, he sent Bartle Frere home and instructed the new
high commissioner, Hercules Robinson, to bring an end to the wars. At
the end of the decade the Basotho were holding their own in the war
and the Transvaal rebels had taken the field against British forces. In the
changed political climate each would score a triumph: the Basotho by
freeing themselves from rule by Cape settlers and gaining a Shepstonian
administrator in the person of Marshall Clarke; the Transvaal Boers by
demanding an independence that Gladstone, with his unbounded faith in
the wisdom of settler colonial government, would readily grant.
CONCLUSION
On the eve of the mineral revolution in South Africa, the region had
adopted most of the political borders that it would take into the twentieth
century. The Transvaal’s frontier with Mozambique was defined in 1869
and its western border in 1885. A decade earlier, the British had finally
141See, for example, H. Giliomee,The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (Cape Town: Tafelberg,
2003), Chapters 6–7.
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relinquished their claims to the southern shore of Delagoa Bay.142 In the
north, Venda chiefs cooperated with Boer hunters and welcomed traders;
but they discouraged the movement of white settlers into the Soutpans-
berg as effectively as did, in the low-lying areas to the east, the anopheles
mosquito and tsetse fly. Although most of South Africa was mapped by
1880, much of this work was sketchy and inaccurate, and it left large areas
unsurveyed. But cartographers had succeeded in condensing an otherwise
engulfing landscape into the manageable proportions of a simple represen-
tation on paper; and they had filled empty spaces with names that were
reassuringly familiar to white settlers.143
The economic growth initiated by the diamond discoveries brought a
new wave of settlers to the subcontinent. Whites increasingly lived in a
world defined by racial experiences and understandings. The racial divide
grew firmer as the frontier closed and the discoveries of science described the
indigenous peoples as “primitives,” occupying an early stage of evolution,
to be protected or annihilated. This view was contradicted by industrious
African Christians who farmed and prospered on mission estates such as
Edendale in Natal, Bethany in the Orange Free State, Botshabelo, and
Welgeval in the eastern and western Transvaal, respectively.144 In some
areas, peasants in the reserves, or tenants living on white-owned farms,
were able to benefit from the market opportunities that accompanied eco-
nomic growth.145 Many of these men increased their wealth by migrating
to farms, plantations, railway works, and mines, where they sold their
labor for limited amounts of time before returning home.146 A few settled
permanently in the towns and, like their rural kinsmen, invested in the edu-
cation offered by mission schools. But black people were mainly confined
142Shillington, Colonisation of the Southern Tswana, 1870–1900, Chapter 6; Harries, Work,
Culture and Identity, pp. 24, 84, 105.
143J. Carruthers, “Friedrich Jeppe: Mapping the Transvaal c. 1850–1899,” Journal of Southern
African Studies, 29(4) (2003).
144S. Meintjes, “Family and Gender in the Christian community at Edendale, Natal, in
colonial times,” in C. Walker (Ed.), Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945 (Cape
Town: David Philip, 1990); A. Schultz, “In Gottes Namen Hu¨tten Bauen. Kirchlicher
Landbesitz in Su¨dafrika – die Berliner Mission und die Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirche
Su¨dafrikas zwischen 1834 und 2002,” (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Humboldt University,
2002).
145N. Etherington, “African Economic Experiments in Colonial Natal, 1845–80,” African
Economic History 5 (1978) pp. 1–15. Duminy and Guest (Eds.), Natal and Zululand, A
New History, pp. 136, 288–9; E. Eldredge, A South African Kingdom: The pursuit of security
in nineteenth-century Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 150–61.
See also note 121 previously.
146K. E. Atkins, The Moon is dead! Give us our Money! The Cultural Origins of an African Work
Ethic, Natal, South Africa, 1843–1900 (London: Heinemann, 1993), Chapter 5.
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to reserves segregated from both the settlers and the modern economy, or
to menial roles as farm tenants or impermanent wage workers. In areas par-
ticularly affected by land alienation and overcrowding, such as the former
British Kafraria, the lineaments of rural slums could be discerned.
People of mixed race increasingly took on a broad identity as coloreds
or, like the San of the Drakensberg and the servile hunter–gatherers in
the northern Transvaal, called “Vaalpens,” headed for extinction. Bantu-
speakers found new, ethnic identities as the missionaries and their African
assistants determined the borders and content of standard, written lan-
guages. In 1865, a Zulu New Testament was added to the Xhosa, Tswana
and South Sotho translations of the Bible. Swiss missionaries produced a
Bible reader in Gwamba (xiTsonga) in 1883 whereas Berlin missionaries
started to delineate standard North Sotho and Venda languages. Church-
men, traders, and travelers spread this new “vernacular” print culture, much
of it coming from centers of Christianity like Kuruman, Lovedale, Morija,
and Ekukanyeni, throughout the subcontinent. Readers of the seven stan-
dard South African “Bantu” languages had the means, along with their
listeners, to escape the small communities bound by oral linguistic forms;
and they found a shared recognition, common set of values, and a purpo-
sive unity in the images, symbols, and stories conveyed by these vehicular
languages.147 With the help of African community patriarchs, colonial
officials in Natal and the Cape fixed the customs and habits of desultory
communities into common “tribes” or peoples such as the amaXhosa and
the amaZulu.148 In the towns, these imagined communities became com-
munities of action and experience as men shaped new forms of material
and social culture, and new strategies of survival and advancement, into
constructed ethnic identities. This new consciousness of self and others was
strengthened when migrants returned home to the patchwork of “tribes”
delineated by linguists and ethnographers.
A hesitant class consciousness emerged out of the social relations devel-
oped in areas of production as far removed as Cape Town and Kimberley,
147A. Ricard, “Introduction” to Thomas Arbousset, Excursion missionnaire dans les Mon-
tagnes bleues (Morija: Morija Archives, 1991), pp. 22–39; K. Mathieson, “Learning South
African Languages: the historical origins of standard Xhosa” (M.A. thesis, University
of Caoe Town, 2000); Harries, “The roots of ethnicity: Discourse and the Politics of
language construction in South Africa,” African Affairs, 346 (1988). Translations of The
Pilgrims Progress appeared in Tswana in 1848, Xhosa (1868), Zulu (1868), South Sotho
(1872). I. Hofmeyr, The Portable Bunyan: A Transnational History of The Pilgrim’s Progress
( Johannesburg: Witwaterrsand University Press, 2004), pp. 116–7, 122, 242.
148N. Erlank, “Gendering Commonality: African men and the 1883 Commission on Native
Law and custom,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 29(4) (2003); Etherington, Great
Treks, pp. 6–7.
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Bloemfontein, and Botshabelo; and this new identity was reinforced as a
slow retail revolution allowing wage-earners and peasants to express them-
selves in new ways as consumers of mass-produced goods. The practices
and beliefs of Christianity particularly cut across the old divisions of kin
and community. In many corners of what was soon to be South Africa,
missionaries raised the fruit of Christianity from the seed first planted by
migrant laborers. Once a mission was established, its influence often spread
little further than the walls of its compound; and missionary Christianity
tended to reinforce the racial divide in South Africa. But by the 1880s,
most of the population in the region had been touched by Christianity.
Some congregations had become financially self-supporting and, in turn,
demanded more control over their affairs, even the right to elect elders
and pastors. An indigenous clergy emerged, consisting of “Native Agents,”
“Evangelists,” and a few ordained ministers, whereas men like Johannes
Dinkwanyane in the eastern Transvaal and Nehemiah Tile in the east-
ern Cape established their own churches.149 On the eastern frontier, some
Christians traced the legitimacy for armed rebellion to their readings of
the Holy Scriptures whereas, in the western Transvaal, others used the new
religion to legitimize their claims to power.150
The settlers in the British colonies celebrated their membership of the
British Empire by participating in pageants, festivals, town illuminations,
regattas to mark the Queen’s birthday, and royal ceremonies, such as the
opening of the Cape Town breakwater by Prince Alfred in 1860.151 Colonial
soldiers quickly formed their own regiments and served on the eastern
frontier, where they were initially appalled by the brutal discipline and
ineptitude of the British army. Several Cape regiments fought in the Ninth
Frontier War but, much to the displeasure of the newly responsible Molteno
government, under a British commander.152 The separate interests of the
149K. Ru¨ther, The Power Beyond: Mission Strategies, African conversion and the development of a
Christian Culture in the Transvaal (Munster: Lit. 2002), Chapter 6; C.C. Saunders, “Tile
and the Thembu Church,” Journal of African History, 11 (1970).
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(Portsmouth and London: Heinemann, 1995).
151L. Witz,Apartheid’s Festival: Contesting South Africa’s National pasts (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2003), pp. 40–1.
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Corps (1856), the Queenstown Rifle Volunteers (1860), the Buffalo Volunteer Rifles
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Several participated in the Basotholand War of 1880–81. The Natal Carbineers (1855)
fought in the Langalibalele campaign and in the Anglo-Zulu war.
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colonists found expression in a thriving print culture that coalesced around
local issues, such as eastern Cape separatism, the importation of convicts,
or the Shepstonian system in Natal. In contrast to the Cape, the colonists
in the Boer republics developed a system of democracy restricted to men of
European descent. Even on the farms, bonds that had once been mutually
accommodating often quickly skewed into exploitative relationships based
on race. Boers found a common unity in opposition to the British, although
this was more acute in the occupied Transvaal than in the Orange Free
State. In 1881, the Transvaal Boers rose up against British rule and, after
the victory at Majuba, regained their independence. All hope of federation
seemed gone forever. However, a new threat to the independence of the
Transvaal emerged at this time. For over a decade, considerable numbers of
British and other foreign miners had made their way to the gold producing
regions around Sabie and Barberton in the east. But these sources of gold
would soon be dwarfed by the discovery in 1886 of outcrop reefs on the
Witwatersrand. As a new wave of miners descended on the Transvaal, a new
struggle for the soul of the republic was about to begin.
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